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Abstract	
A	growing	experimental	literature	studies	the	endogenous	choice	of	institutions	to	solve	
cooperation	problems	arising	in	prisoners’	dilemmas,	public	goods	games,	and	common	
pool	 resource	 games.	 Participants	 in	 these	 experiments	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	
influence	the	rules	of	the	game	before	they	play	the	game.	In	this	paper,	we	review	the	
experimental	 literature	 of	 the	 last	 20	 years	 on	 the	 choice	 of	 institutions	 and	describe	
what	 has	 been	 learned	 about	 the	 quality	 and	 the	determinants	 of	 institutional	 choice.	
Almost	 all	 institutions	 improve	 cooperation	 if	 they	 are	 implemented,	 but	 they	 are	not	
always	implemented	by	the	players.	Institutional	costs,	remaining	free‐riding	incentives,	
and	a	 lack	of	 learning	opportunities	are	the	most	 important	barriers.	At	 the	 individual	
level,	own	cooperativeness	and	beliefs	about	other	players’	behavior	can	be	identified	as	
important	 determinants	 of	 institutional	 choice.	 Cooperation	 tends	 to	 be	 higher	 under	
endogenously	 chosen	 institutions	 than	 exogenously	 imposed	 institutions.	 However,	 a	
significant	 share	 of	 players	 fails	 to	 implement	 the	 institution	 and	 they	 often	 perform	
poorly,	 which	 is	 why	 we	 cannot	 conclude	 that	 letting	 people	 choose	 is	 better	 than	
enforcing	institutions	from	outside.	
JEL:	C71;	C91;	C92;	D02;	D70;	H41	
Keywords:	 Literature	 review;	 experiments;	 cooperation;	 public	 goods;	 endogenous	
institutional	choice;	voting	
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1.	Introduction	
The	 tension	 between	 self‐interest	 and	 collective	 interest	 is	 a	 central	 challenge	 in	 all	
social	 relationships	 and	 understanding	 how	 societies	 can	 solve	 the	 challenge	 and	
achieve	cooperation	among	members	is	important	to	economics	and	other	disciplines.	In	
many	 real‐life	 cooperation	 problems,	 societies	 themselves	 determine	 the	 rules	 that	
govern	 the	 interactions	 of	 their	 members.	 For	 instance,	 government	 representatives	
negotiate	 and	 establish	 rules	 on	 how	 to	 protect	 global	 security	 or	 prevent	 climate	
change.	Users	of	common	pool	resources	develop	rules	to	ensure	sustainable	harvest	of	
the	resource.	Work	teams	establish	rules	on	how	to	reward	positive	contributions	to	the	
common	 goal	 and	 how	 to	 punish	 free	 riders.	 In	 all	 these	 cases,	 actors	 who	 are	
confronted	 with	 the	 cooperation	 problem	 are	 also	 the	 ones	 who	 establish	 the	 rules,	
restricting	their	own	behavior,	which	is	known	as	endogenous	choice	of	institutions.	
Although	 there	are	numerous	 institutions,	 formal	and	 informal,	 regulating	behavior	 in	
societies,	 they	are	not	all	equally	successful.	For	example,	anti‐smoking	 legislation	had	
very	 different	 effects	 in	 Norway	 and	 Greece	 (Nyborg	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Some	 institutions	
thrive	 while	 others	 become	 extinct	 after	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time.	 For	 example,	 the	
Montreal	Protocol	on	the	protection	of	the	ozone	layer	is	widely	seen	as	success	and	the	
ozone	layer	is	expected	to	be	largely	restored	by	the	year	2050.	By	contrast,	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	 on	 climate	 change	 has	 been	 criticized	 heavily	 and,	 when	 the	 time	 came,	
negotiators	 decided	 not	 to	 extend	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 but	 instead	 to	 design	 a	 new	
agreement.	
It	 is	 very	difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 to	 identify	 the	 reasons	why	 some	 institutions	 are	
implemented	 successfully	 and	 solve	 the	 cooperation	 problem	 while	 others	 are	 not	
implemented	 or	 they	 are	 implemented	 but	 fail	 to	 change	 behavior.	 There	 are	 many	
potential	 reasons	 which	 may	 also	 influence	 each	 other.	 For	 instance,	 success	 may	
depend	on	the	society	trying	to	implement	the	institution,	the	type	of	the	institution	and	
the	process	 of	 implementation,	 the	 circumstances,	 or	 a	 combination	of	 all.	 Laboratory	
experiments	have	the	advantage	that	they	allow	for	observing	behavior	under	controlled	
conditions,	 free	 of	 confounding	 factors.	 After	many	 years	 of	 investigating	 cooperation	
under	exogenously	given	institutional	settings	(for	reviews,	see	Ledyard,	1995;	Zelmer,	
2003;	 Chaudhuri,	 2011),	 an	 important	 experimental	 literature	 has	 begun	 to	 study	 the	
endogenous	choice	of	 institutions	 in	cooperation	games.	This	 literature	started	around	
the	year	2000	(an	early	exception	is	the	experiment	by	Ostrom	et	al.,	1992)	and	has	been	
growing	 ever	 since.	The	 studies	 reveal	 institutional	 choices	by	 individuals	 and	 groups	
under	different	circumstances	and	different	types	of	institutions,	and	how	they	fare	after	
having	chosen	the	institution.	Specifically,	we	can	observe	how	many	players	choose	the	
institution,	 how	 these	 players	 perform	 relative	 to	 the	 players	who	 decide	 against	 the	
institution,	 how	 the	 players	who	 choose	 the	 institution	 differ	 from	 those	who	 decide	
against	 it,	and	how	behavior	changes	over	 time	as	players	 learn	 from	past	experience.	
With	 careful	 design,	 we	 can	 observe	 how	 the	 type	 of	 institution,	 the	 process	 of	
implementation,	 and	 the	 circumstances	 affect	 institutional	 choice	 and	 ultimately	
cooperation.		
3	
 
Experiments	 are	 also	 able	 to	 reveal	 the	 difference	 between	 endogenously	 chosen	
institutions	and	exogenously	imposed	institutions.	This	difference	is	highly	relevant	for	
policy	whenever	a	 regulator	has	 the	power	 to	enforce	regulations	but	may	want	 leave	
the	 decision	 to	 the	 constituency,	 to	 be	 taken	 for	 example	 in	 a	 referendum,	 if	 this	
promises	a	better	outcome	 in	 the	end.	The	comparison	between	exogenously	 imposed	
and	endogenously	chosen	institutions	also	reveals	important	insights	into	the	different	
effects	 driving	 cooperative	 behavior.	When	 an	 institution	 is	 exogenously	 imposed	 (or	
not),	 the	difference	 in	behavior	between	the	players	who	act	under	the	 institution	and	
those	who	 do	 not	 is	 driven	 by	 only	 one	 effect,	 namely	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 institution.	 In	
contrast,	 when	 an	 institution	 is	 endogenously	 chosen,	 the	 difference	 in	 behavior	
between	the	players	who	choose	the	institution	and	those	who	decide	against	it,	can	be	
the	result	of	four	different	effects:	an	institution	effect,	a	selection	effect,	an	information	
effect,	and	a	democracy	effect.	The	first	effect,	the	institution	effect,	captures	the	change	
in	cooperative	behavior	due	to	the	introduction	of	the	institution.	This	effect	is	the	same	
as	when	the	institution	is	introduced	exogenously.	The	selection	effect	arises	because	of	
self‐selection	into	the	institution.	There	may	be	observable	or	unobservable	factors	that	
affect	 both	 subjects’	 choice	 of	 the	 institution	 and	 their	 cooperation.	 The	 information	
effect	is	caused	by	the	information	that	comes	with	the	institutional	choice.	The	process	
of	 institutional	 choice	 reveals	 information	 to	 the	 subjects	 about	 their	 partners’	
preferences.	 This	 information	 may	 be	 used	 to	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 the	 partners’	
future	 behavior	 and	 this,	 in	 turn,	may	 change	 the	 subjects’	 own	 behavior.	 The	 fourth	
effect	is	a	genuine	democracy	effect	and	is	solely	caused	by	the	process	of	choosing	the	
institution	through,	for	example,	strengthened	feelings	of	group	identity.1	Because	of	the	
effects	 of	 selection,	 information,	 and	 democracy	 we	 would	 expect	 different	 outcomes	
with	endogenous	choice	of	institutions	than	with	exogenously	imposed	institutions.	
The	review	focuses	on	five	main	lessons,	each	presented	in	a	separate	section.	In	Section	
2,	we	provide	a	framework	that	helps	to	categorize	the	experimental	studies	along	two	
dimensions:	 the	scale	of	 the	cooperation	problem	(local	versus	global)	and	 the	way	of	
choosing	the	institution	(voting	with	one’s	feet	versus	majority	voting).	This	framework	
is	useful	to	understand	the	main	differences	between	the	studies’	basic	designs	and	their	
results.	Section	3	describes	how	many	individuals	and	groups	choose	the	institution	and	
how	 they	 perform	 relative	 to	 those	 individuals	 and	 groups	 that	 decide	 against	 the	
institution.	In	those	cases	where	players	cannot	only	choose	whether	to	implement	the	
institution	 or	 not	 but	 also	 the	 type	 of	 the	 institution,	 we	 describe	 which	 type	 of	
institution	is	predominantly	selected.	Section	4	describes	which	personal	characteristics	
and	attitudes	influence	the	institutional	choice.	In	Section	5,	we	describe	the	differences	
in	 behavior	 when	 the	 institution	 is	 endogenously	 implemented	 by	 the	 players	
themselves	and	when	it	is	exogenously	imposed	and	where	these	differences	come	from.	
Finally,	in	Section	6,	we	summarize	our	main	findings	and	discuss	promising	avenues	for	
future	 research	 in	 this	 field.	 The	 Supplementary	 Material	 contains	 tables	 with	 all	 38	
                                                            
1	Theory	on	procedural	utility	suggests	that	people	do	not	only	value	outcomes	but	also	the	process	which	
leads	to	an	outcome	(Frey	et	al.,	2004;	Frey	and	Stutzer,	2005).	According	to	this	theory,	having	a	choice	
per	se	can	change	behavior	and	lead	to	more	group‐oriented	decisions.	
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studies	 included	 in	 this	 review	 and	 detailed	 information	 about	 their	 experimental	
designs,	sorted	according	to	the	framework	presented	in	Section	2.2	
	
2.	Framework	
The	 baseline	 cooperation	 game	 in	 all	 studies	 covered	 by	 this	 review	 is	 a	 prisoners’	
dilemma,	a	public	goods	game,	or	a	common	pool	resource	game	which	is	played	by	two	
or	 more	 players	 who	 have	 a	 dominant	 strategy	 to	 behave	 non‐cooperatively.3	 We	
consider	institutions	that	change	the	rules	of	the	cooperation	game	in	a	significant	way	
by	either	changing	 the	payoffs	or	 the	available	strategies.	We	can	distinguish	between	
two	 main	 types	 of	 institutions:	 formal	 institutions	 that,	 once	 implemented,	 are	
exogenously	 enforced	 and	 informal	 institutions	 that,	 if	 implemented,	 still	 need	 to	 be	
enforced	 by	 the	 players	 themselves.	 Formal	 institutions	 may	 modify	 the	 payoffs	 to	
playing	certain	strategies,	for	example,	put	a	fine	on	free	riding,	or	they	may	restrict	the	
available	 strategies,	 for	 example,	 eliminate	 the	 possibility	 to	 free	 ride	 altogether.	 If	 a	
formal	 institution	 involves	 an	 institutional	 cost,	 it	 is	 typically	 born	 by	 all	 players.	
Informal	 institutions	 offer	 the	 players	 an	 option	 to	 punish	 or	 reward	 other	 players	
which	they	may	or	may	not	use.	The	cost	of	the	institution	in	this	case	is	only	born	by	the	
players	who	use	it.	
Table	1	illustrates	the	two	dimensions	which	we	use	to	categorize	the	studies:	the	scale	
of	 the	 cooperation	 problem	 and	 the	way	 of	 choosing	 the	 institution.	 The	 scale	 of	 the	
cooperation	problem	can	be	 local,	meaning	 that	 the	population	 is	divided	 into	 several	
subgroups	and	the	benefits	of	cooperation	are	reaped	only	by	the	members	of	the	same	
subgroup,	 or	 the	 scale	 can	be	global,	meaning	 that	 the	population	may	or	may	not	be	
divided	into	subgroups	but	the	benefits	of	cooperation	are	always	reaped	by	the	entire	
population.	 On	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 institution,	we	 distinguish	 between	 voting	with	one’s	
feet,	meaning	 that	 the	 institution	 only	 applies	 to	 those	 individuals	who	 have	 voted	 in	
favor	of	it,	and	majority	voting,	meaning	that	the	group	as	a	whole	makes	the	decision	via	
voting	and	the	institution	is	binding	for	everyone	(or	no	one).4	Hence,	with	voting	with	
one’s	 feet,	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 determine	 the	 institution	 under	which	 they	will	 act	
with	 certainty	whereas,	with	majority	 voting,	 they	 can	only	 affect	 the	probability	 that	
the	 institution	 will	 be	 implemented.	 Combining	 the	 two	 dimensions,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	
cooperation	problem	 and	 the	way	 of	 choosing	 the	 institution,	 results	 in	 four	different	
situations	which	are	depicted	in	Table	1.	
	
                                                            
2	Dal	Bó	(2014)	provides	a	review	of	part	of	this	experimental	literature.	He	includes	11	studies	that	are	
partly	included	in	this	review,	too.	
3	We	do	not	include	studies	in	which	the	original	cooperation	game	does	not	involve	a	dominant	strategy	
to	 behave	 non‐cooperatively.	 That	means,	 for	 example,	 that	 we	 do	 not	 include	 threshold	 public	 goods	
games	or	 indefinitely	 repeated	games.	Neither	 do	we	 include	 studies	 in	which	 the	 game	 essentially	 re‐
mains	the	same	and	only	the	players’	beliefs	or	their	perception	of	the	game	are	changed,	for	example,	by	
framing	the	context	differently	or	allowing	for	communication	or	non‐binding	agreements	(e.g.	Dannen‐
berg,	2015).	We	also	do	not	include	studies	in	which	players	decide	whether	or	not	to	delegate	their	con‐
tribution	decision	or	 their	 right	 to	punish	someone	 to	other	group	members	 (e.g.	Hamman	et	al.,	2011;	
Gross	et	al.,	2016).	
4	When	 the	group	as	a	whole	decides	via	voting,	 the	chosen	 institution	does	not	necessarily	have	 to	be	
binding	for	everyone.	In	the	experiments	reviewed	here,	however,	this	is	usually	the	case.	
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Table	1.	Framework	
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a.	Local	cooperation	with	voting	with	
one’s	feet	
	
Individuals	decide	individually	and	
the	institution,	if	implemented,	ap‐
plies	only	to	the	individuals	who	
have	chosen	it.	Cooperation	benefits	
only	members	of	the	same	subgroup.
b. Local	cooperation	with	majority	
voting	
	
Group	decides	jointly	and	the	insti‐
tution,	if	implemented,	applies	to	the	
entire	group.	Cooperation	benefits	
only	members	of	the	same	subgroup.
	
Gl
ob
al
	
	
c. Global	cooperation	with	voting	
with	one’s	feet	
	
Individuals	decide	individually	and	
the	institution,	if	implemented,	ap‐
plies	only	to	the	individuals	who	
have	chosen	it.	Cooperation	benefits	
the	entire	group.		
d. Global	cooperation	with	majority	
voting 
 
Group	decides	jointly	and	the	insti‐
tution,	if	implemented,	applies	to	the	
entire	group.	Cooperation	benefits	
the	entire	group.	
 
Panel	 (a)	 in	Table	1	 illustrates	a	situation	where	 the	cooperation	problem	 is	 local	and	
players	vote	with	their	feet.	All	studies	that	fall	into	this	category	are	summarized	in	Ta‐
ble	 S.1	 in	 the	 Supplementary	Material.	 Choosing	 an	 institution	 in	 this	 setting	not	 only	
determines	 the	 institution	 under	which	 one	will	 act	 but	 also	 the	 interaction	 partners.	
The	studies	in	this	category	are	therefore	closely	related	to	the	literature	on	partner	se‐
lection	 and	 social	 networks.5	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 uncertainty	 about	 individuals’	
institutional	 choice	 so	 that	 players	 have	 unambiguous	 information	 about	 their	 co‐
players’	 institutional	 choices.	Real‐world	 examples	 for	 this	 setting	 are	voluntary	work	
teams,	clubs,	neighborhoods,	or	more	generally	groups	in	which	participation	is	volun‐
tary	and	cooperation	within	the	group	does	not	have	spill‐over	effects	on	people	outside	
the	 group.	 Though	 there	 are	 no	 hard‐wired	 spill‐over	 effects,	 players	 may	 still	 learn	
about	the	performance	of	other	(neighboring)	groups	and	change	their	own	behavior.	A	
well‐cited	 study	 in	 this	 category	 is	 Gürerk	 et	 al.	 (2006)	where	 individuals	 repeatedly	
choose	between	a	standard	public	goods	game	and	a	public	goods	game	with	an	informal	
sanctioning	institution	which	allows	players	to	punish	or	reward	other	players	at	a	cer‐
tain	cost.	After	making	the	choice,	players	play	the	chosen	game	with	all	 those	players	
who	have	chosen	the	same	game.		
Panel	(b)	in	Table	1	illustrates	local	cooperation	with	majority	voting	of	the	institution.	
The	corresponding	studies	are	summarized	in	Table	S.2	in	the	Supplementary	Material.	
In	this	setting,	the	population	collectively	chooses	the	institution	by	majority	voting	and	
                                                            
5	 See,	 for	 example,	Barclay	 and	Willer	 (2007),	Brekke	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 Page	 et	 al.	 (2005),	Hauk	and	Nagel	
(2001),	Riedl	and	Ule	(2002),	and	Rand	et	al.	(2011).	
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the	population‐wide	 institution	 then	 governs	 all	 local	 interactions	 among	members	 of	
subgroups.	Examples	 for	 this	 setting	are	 institutions,	 such	as	 liability	 rules	or	 rules	of	
good	conduct,	that	are	chosen	at	the	societal	 level	and	govern	all	 interactions	between	
subsets	of	players	within	the	society.	In	this	case,	players	typically	have	only	aggregate	
information	about	the	choice	of	the	institution	but	not	about	individual	choices.	A	recent	
experiment	 in	 this	category	 is	Dal	Bó	et	al.	 (2018)	which	studies	pairwise	 interactions	
within	populations	of	six	subjects.	Players	first	play	a	prisoners’	dilemma	and	then	vote	
on	 the	 implementation	of	 a	 fine	 that	 reduces	 the	payoff	 to	playing	every	 strategy,	 but	
with	 the	 payoff	 to	 defection	 falling	 by	 more	 than	 the	 payoff	 to	 cooperation.	 In	 this	
modified	 game,	mutual	 cooperation	 has	 a	 lower	 payoff	 than	 in	 the	 original	 prisoners’	
dilemma	but	 cooperation	becomes	 the	dominant	 strategy	 for	both	players.	The	 fine	 is	
implemented	 for	 the	 entire	 population	 if,	 depending	 on	 treatment,	 a	 majority	 or	 a	
randomly	selected	player	votes	in	favor	of	it.	
Panel	(c)	represents	a	setting	in	which	players	vote	with	their	feet	but	the	cooperation	
problem	 is	 global.	 Table	 S.3	 in	 the	 Supplementary	 Material	 gives	 an	 overview	 of	 all	
studies	 falling	 into	 this	 category.	 A	 good	 real‐world	 example	 for	 this	 setting	 is	 an	
international	 treaty	 where	 some	 nation	 states	 participate	 and	 commit	 to	 provide	 a	
global	 public	 good,	 like	 the	 protection	 of	 endangered	 species	 or	mitigation	 of	 climate	
change,	 while	 other	 states	 do	 not	 commit	 but	 still	 benefit	 from	 the	 provision	 of	 the	
public	 good.	 In	 this	 setting,	 there	 is	 unambiguous	 information	 about	 players’	 choices	
and,	by	design,	non‐members	are	better	off	than	members	of	the	institution.	Kosfeld	et	
al.	 (2009)	is	a	well‐cited	study	in	this	category.	Fixed	groups	of	 four	 individuals	play	a	
repeated	 public	 goods	 game	with	 three	 stages.	 Players	 first	 announce	whether	 or	 not	
they	are	willing	 to	enter	a	coalition.	After	being	 informed	about	 the	number	of	willing	
participants,	 the	 potential	members	 decide	 to	 implement	 the	 coalition	 or	 not,	 using	 a	
unanimity	 rule.	 Finally,	 players	 choose	 their	 contributions	 to	 the	 public	 good	 with	
members	being	bound	to	contribute	their	full	endowment	while	non‐members	are	free	
in	their	choice.		
Panel	(d)	illustrates	a	situation	where	the	cooperation	problem	is	global	and	players	use	
majority	 voting	 to	 decide	 collectively	 on	 a	 population‐wide	 institution.	 Most	 of	 the	
studies	fall	into	this	category	and	they	are	presented	in	Table	S.4	in	the	Supplementary	
Material.	A	society	that	chooses	a	tax	scheme	to	fund	its	public	infrastructure	or	a	group	
of	 common	 pool	 resource	 users	 who	 establish	 rules	 for	 harvesting	 the	 resource	 can	
serve	 as	 examples.	 A	 well‐cited	 study	 in	 this	 category	 is	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2010).	 In	 this	
experiment,	 fixed	 groups	 of	 four	 individuals	 choose	 to	 play	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	
game,	a	public	goods	game	with	an	informal	punishment	option,	or	a	public	goods	game	
with	 an	 informal	 reward	 option.	 Voting	 is	 voluntary,	 costly	 for	 the	 voters,	 and	 it	 is	
repeated	until	unanimity	is	reached.	The	voting	outcome	is	binding	for	the	entire	group	
and	for	all	ten	rounds	of	play.		
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3.	Choice	of	the	institution	and	cooperation	
In	this	section	we	describe	how	many	players	choose	the	institution,	how	many	players	
decide	against	the	institution,	and	how	these	two	different	groups	perform	after	having	
made	 the	 institutional	 decision.	 We	 sort	 the	 studies	 according	 to	 the	 categories	
presented	in	the	previous	section.	Within	each	category,	we	present	very	similar	studies	
consecutively	 and	 try	 to	 sort	 studies	 according	 to	 the	 theoretical	 strength	 of	 the	
institutions,	 starting	 with	 institutions	 which	 change	 the	 equilibrium	 and	 ending	 with	
institutions	which	do	not	change	the	equilibrium	of	the	original	cooperation	game.		
	
3.1	Local	cooperation	and	voting	with	one’s	feet	
Grimm	 and	 Mengel	 (2011)	 let	 players	 sort	 themselves	 individually	 into	 a	 prisoners’	
dilemma	or	a	modified	version	of	the	game	where	the	payoffs	to	defection	are	reduced	
and	 cooperation	 is	 the	 dominant	 strategy.	 The	 games	 are	 played	 for	 100	 rounds	 and	
each	player	out	of	eight	is	allowed	to	choose	between	the	two	games	every	fourth	round.	
By	design,	half	the	players	start	to	play	the	modified	game	and	about	70	percent	of	them	
choose	to	cooperate.	Almost	all	subjects	select	the	modified	game	in	the	second	half	of	
the	experiment	and	the	cooperation	rate	is	close	to	100	percent.	The	original	prisoners’	
dilemma	is	played	only	 in	the	first	half	of	the	experiment	and	the	average	cooperation	
rate	is	16	percent.	Average	payoffs	are	significantly	higher	in	the	modified	game.	
In	 a	 similar	 experiment	 by	 Grimm	 and	 Mengel	 (2009),	 players	 sort	 themselves	
individually	 into	 a	 prisoners’	 dilemma	 or	 a	 modified	 game	 with	 lower	 payoffs	 to	
defection.	 The	 modification	 does	 not	 change	 the	 unique	 defection	 equilibrium	 but	 it	
nevertheless	 leads	 to	 different	 behavior.	 By	 design,	 half	 the	 players	 start	 to	 play	 the	
modified	game	and	more	than	60	percent	of	them	choose	to	cooperate.	About	two‐thirds	
of	players	play	the	modified	game	in	the	second	half	of	the	experiment	and	around	60	
percent	of	them	choose	to	cooperate	on	average.	The	remaining	players	play	the	original	
prisoners’	 dilemma	 and	 only	 10	 percent	 of	 them	 choose	 to	 cooperate	 on	 average.	
Average	 payoffs	 are	 also	 higher	 in	 the	 modified	 game.	 The	 proportion	 of	 players	
choosing	 the	 modified	 game	 increases	 slightly	 when	 information	 about	 the	 average	
payoffs	in	both	games	is	provided.	
Cobo‐Reyes	et	al.	 (2019)	 first	assign	subjects	randomly	to	one	of	 two	groups	with	one	
group	 playing	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	 and	 the	 other	 group	 playing	 a	modified	
version	with	a	fixed	cost	where	free	riding	is	automatically	punished	and	cooperation	is	
the	 dominant	 strategy.	 After	 this	 initial	 assignment,	 individuals	 are	 allowed	 to	 switch	
between	 the	 two	groups	 in	every	 round.	The	parameters	are	chosen	so	 that	efficiency	
requires	the	players	to	stay	in	their	initial	group	and	contribute	their	full	endowment	to	
the	 public	 good.	 Cooperation	 is	 significantly	 higher	 with	 punishment	 institution	 than	
without	 (approximately	 90	 versus	 40	percent)	 throughout	 the	 30	 rounds	 of	 play,	 and	
also	payoffs	are	 significantly	higher	with	 the	 institution	despite	 the	 fixed	cost.	Players	
are	informed	about	the	performance	in	both	groups	and	there	is	increasing	migration	to	
the	punishment	 institution.	At	the	end	about	75	percent	of	players	reside	 in	the	group	
with	punishment	institution.	In	another	treatment,	the	two	groups	first	decide	whether	
8	
 
they	want	to	implement	the	punishment	institution	using	majority	voting,	and	then	the	
individuals	decide	whether	 they	want	 to	move	 to	 the	other	 group.	There	 is	much	 less	
migration	in	this	treatment.	As	before,	cooperation	is	higher	with	punishment	institution	
than	without	 (approximately	 90	 versus	 50	 percent)	 and	 also	 payoffs	 are	 significantly	
higher.	 The	 share	 of	 groups	 implementing	 the	 punishment	 institution	 increases	
moderately	over	time	from	42	to	58	percent.	
Participants	in	the	experiment	by	Gürerk	et	al.	(2006)	sort	themselves	individually	into	
a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	 or	 a	 game	 with	 an	 informal	 sanctioning	 option.	 The	
sanctioning	option	can	be	used	to	punish	or	reward	other	players	at	some	cost.	At	 the	
beginning	of	the	30	rounds	of	play,	only	37	percent	of	players	choose	the	game	with	the	
sanctioning	 option.	 These	 players	 contribute	 on	 average	 about	 64	 percent	 of	 the	
endowment	 to	 the	 public	 good	 and	 many	 of	 them	 are	 willing	 to	 punish	 low	
contributions.	 The	 remaining	 63	 percent	 of	 players	 choose	 the	 standard	 game	 at	 the	
beginning	and	contribute	only	37	percent	of	the	endowment	to	the	public	good.	Players	
get	detailed	information	about	the	performance	in	both	games	and	over	time	more	and	
more	players	migrate	to	the	game	with	sanctioning	option.	In	the	last	round,	93	percent	
of	 the	 players	 choose	 the	 sanctioning	 institution	 and	 the	 average	 contribution	 rate	 in	
this	game	is	97	percent.	As	punishment	is	used	primarily	 in	the	beginning	of	the	game	
and	much	less	in	later	rounds,	payoffs	are	on	average	higher	in	the	modified	game	than	
in	the	standard	game.	
In	a	 follow‐up	study,	Gürerk	et	al.	 (2014)	 let	 individuals	 repeatedly	choose	between	a	
standard	public	goods	game	and	a	game	with	an	informal	punishment	option.	Similar	to	
their	 first	 study,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 30	 rounds,	 only	 about	 one‐third	 of	 players	
choose	 the	 game	with	punishment	 option	 and	 the	 average	 contribution	 rate	 for	 these	
players	 is	 about	 65	 percent.	 The	 other	 70	 percent	 of	 players	 start	 by	 playing	 the	
standard	game	and	 their	average	contribution	rate	 is	about	39	percent.	Again,	players	
receive	 detailed	 information	 about	 performance	 in	 both	 games	 and	 over	 time	 they	
migrate	 from	 the	 standard	 game	 to	 the	 game	with	punishment	 option	 and	make	high	
contributions.	 In	 the	 last	round,	90	percent	of	players	play	 the	game	with	punishment	
option	and	they	all	contribute	maximally	to	the	public	good.	Across	all	rounds,	payoffs	
are	significantly	higher	in	the	punishment	game	than	in	the	standard	game.	In	a	second	
treatment,	 players	 choose	 between	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	 and	 a	 game	 with	
informal	 reward	 option	 in	 which	 players	 can	 pay	 to	 reward	 other	 players.	 Here,	 a	
relatively	 stable	 share	 of	 about	 80	 percent	 of	 players	 choose	 the	 game	 with	 reward	
option	throughout	all	rounds	and	the	average	contribution	rate	 for	these	players	 is	52	
percent	with	a	slight	downward	trend	over	time.	The	remaining	players	in	the	standard	
game	 have	 an	 average	 contribution	 rate	 of	 around	 24	 percent,	 also	 showing	 a	 slight	
downward	 trend	 over	 time.	 The	 reward	 option	 is	 thus	 less	 effective	 in	 increasing	
cooperation	than	the	punishment	option	but	 it	 is	still	popular,	arguably	because	 it	can	
increase	 total	 efficiency	as	 the	 cost	of	 a	one‐unit	 reward	 is	 lower	 than	 the	benefit.	On	
average,	payoffs	are	higher	in	the	reward	game	than	in	the	standard	game.	
Gürerk	 (2013)	 examines	 how	 providing	 ex‐ante	 information	 about	 the	 choice	 and	
performance	of	previous	players	affects	 subjects’	behavior.	He	uses	 the	 same	setup	as	
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the	punishment	treatment	in	Gürerk	et	al.	(2014)	and	uses	their	results	for	the	ex‐ante	
information.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 providing	 ex‐ante	 information	 affects	 individuals’	
institutional	 choice	 and	 cooperation	 mostly	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 game.	 When	
information	is	provided,	54	percent	of	players	join	the	punishment	institution	in	the	first	
round	and	they	contribute	80	percent	of	 the	endowment	on	average.	The	players	who	
join	the	standard	game	contribute	20	percent.	Without	information,	only	31	percent	of	
players	join	the	punishment	institution	in	the	first	round	and	they	contribute	65	percent	
on	 average.	 The	 players	 in	 the	 standard	 game	 contribute	 35	 percent.	 Over	 time	more	
and	 more	 players	 join	 the	 punishment	 institution	 in	 both	 conditions	 and	 make	 high	
contributions.	The	differences	between	treatments	become	smaller	over	time	and,	in	the	
last	 round,	 almost	 all	 players	 in	 both	 conditions	 join	 the	 punishment	 institution	 and	
contribute	the	full	endowment.	In	both	conditions,	payoffs	in	the	punishment	game	are	
initially	 lower	 than	 in	 the	 standard	game	but	 they	are	higher	 towards	 the	end	and	on	
average.	Ex‐ante	information	makes	the	payoffs	increase	faster	at	the	beginning.	
The	 experiment	 by	 Nicklisch	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 allows	 individuals	 to	 join	 one	 out	 of	 three	
games:	 (i)	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	 without	 punishment,	 (ii)	 a	 game	 with	 an	
informal	punishment	option	where	players	can	punish	each	other,	and	(iii)	a	game	with	
a	central	punishment	scheme	where	a	randomly	selected	subject	from	outside	the	group	
can	punish	group	members.	 Individuals	 receive	 information	about	 the	outcomes	 in	all	
three	games	and	they	choose	between	the	games	every	four	rounds	over	a	period	of	32	
rounds.	 In	 three	 different	 treatments,	 the	 players’	 contributions	 are	 displayed	 to	 the	
others	always	correctly	 (10	out	of	10	 times),	almost	always	correctly	 (9	out	of	10),	or	
only	 half	 the	 time	 correctly	 (5	 out	 of	 10).	 Both	 punishment	 institutions	 are	 relatively	
unpopular	 at	 the	 beginning	 irrespective	 of	 the	 noise	 level.	 Over	 time	 the	 support	
increases	in	all	three	conditions.	At	the	end	of	the	game,	more	than	80	percent	of	players	
reside	in	one	of	the	two	punishment	institutions	when	the	noise	level	is	zero	or	low,	and	
more	 than	 60	 percent	 play	 with	 punishment	 when	 the	 noise	 level	 is	 high.	 Average	
contributions	and	payoffs	are	significantly	higher	with	punishment	than	without,	but	the	
differences	become	smaller	and	partly	insignificant	when	the	noise	level	increases.	
Fehr	 and	Williams	 (2017)	 let	 individuals	 sort	 themselves	 repeatedly	 into	 one	 of	 four	
games:	 (i)	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	 without	 punishment,	 (ii)	 a	 game	 with	 an	
informal	uncoordinated	punishment	option	where	players	can	punish	each	other	after	
the	 contribution	 stage,	 (iii)	 a	 game	 with	 an	 informal	 coordinated	 punishment	 option	
where	players	are	first	asked	what	they	think	should	be	contributed	to	the	public	good	
and	 subsequently	 informed	 about	 the	 average	 expectations,	 then	 they	 choose	 their	
contributions	 and	 afterwards	 may	 punish	 each	 other,	 and	 (iv)	 a	 game	 with	 central	
punishment	 where	 players	 are	 first	 asked	 about	 and	 informed	 about	 each	 other’s	
expectations,	 then	 choose	 their	 contributions,	 and	 afterwards	 one	 elected	 player	may	
punish	 other	 players.	 Players	 choose	 between	 the	 different	 games	 every	 round	 and	
before	they	choose,	they	are	informed	about	the	average	earnings	in	each	game.	When	
individuals	 choose	 the	 first	 time,	 about	 one‐third	 of	 them	 choose	 the	 standard	 game	
without	punishment	option	and	their	average	contribution	rate	is	about	20	percent.	The	
other	two‐thirds	choose	either	coordinated	peer	punishment	or	central	punishment	and	
the	average	contribution	rate	for	those	players	is	about	90	percent.	After	a	few	rounds	of	
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playing,	 these	 two	 institutions	 exist	 almost	 exclusively	 with	 about	 half	 the	 subjects	
joining	the	institution	that	delegates	punishment	to	a	representative	and	the	other	half	
joining	 the	 institution	 that	 allows	 all	 players	 to	 punish.	 The	 standard	 game	 becomes	
extinct	very	quickly	and	the	uncoordinated	punishment	option	is	almost	never	chosen.	
This	 shows	 that	 providing	 information	 about	 the	 players’	 expectations	 before	
contributions	and	punishments	are	chosen	serves	as	a	very	useful	coordination	device.	
The	two	punishment	institutions	that	include	this	stage	lead	to	very	high	contributions	
rates	between	90	and	100	percent	from	the	beginning.	They	also	lead	to	higher	payoffs	
than	the	standard	game	from	the	beginning	because	punishments	are	rarely	needed.		
Figure	1	provides	an	overview	of	these	findings.6	Each	bar	represents	an	experimental	
treatment	with	the	lower	part	showing	the	share	of	individuals	inside	the	institution	and	
the	 upper	 part	 showing	 the	 share	 of	 individuals	 outside	 the	 institution.	 The	 colors	
indicate	the	cooperation	rates	inside	and	outside	the	institution.	The	upper	panel	shows	
institutional	 choices	when	 subjects	 choose	 the	 first	 time	 and	 cooperation	 rates	 in	 the	
first	 round	 following	 the	choice	of	 the	 institution.	The	 lower	panel	shows	 institutional	
choices	when	subjects	choose	the	last	time	and	cooperation	rates	in	the	last	round	after	
the	 final	 choice	 of	 the	 institution.	 The	 figure	 confirms	 that	 subjects	 who	 join	 the	
institution	behave	much	more	cooperatively	than	those	who	do	not	join	the	institution.	
Taking	the	experimental	treatment	as	unit	of	observation	and	using	two‐sided	Wilcoxon	
signed‐rank	tests,	we	find	that	average	cooperation	rates	are	significantly	higher	inside	
the	institution	than	outside	the	institution	both	in	the	first	round	(69	versus	33	percent,	
P	=	0.0017)	 and	 in	 the	 last	 round	 (82	 versus	 10	 percent,	 P	=	0.0016).	 The	 figure	 also	
shows	 that	 subjects	 choose	 very	 differently	 in	 later	 rounds	 when	 they	 have	 gained	
experience	than	when	they	choose	the	first	time.	Significantly	more	subjects	choose	the	
institution	in	the	 last	round	than	in	the	first	round	(84	versus	43	percent,	P	=	0.0017).	
Cooperation	 inside	the	 institution	 increases	 from	the	 first	 to	the	 last	round	(69	versus	
82	percent,	P	=	0.0231)	while	cooperation	outside	the	 institution	decreases	(33	versus	
10	percent,	P	=	0.0025).7	The	last	bar	in	the	figure	shows	an	institution	which	does	not	
fully	 eliminate	 the	 free‐riding	 incentives:	 the	prisoners’	dilemma	with	 lower	defection	
payoffs	 in	Grimm	and	Mengel	 (2009).	Under	 this	 institution,	 free‐riders	earn	 less	 than	
without	 the	 institution,	 but	 ceteris	 paribus	 they	 still	 earn	 more	 than	 if	 they	 had	
cooperated.	 These	 remaining	 free‐riding	 incentives	 limit	 cooperation	 inside	 the	
institution	 and	 also	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 institution.	 The	 punishment	 institution	 in	
Nicklisch	et	 al.	 (2016)	 shown	 in	 the	 second‐to‐last	bar	 suffers	 from	noisy	 information	
about	who	 is	a	 cooperator	and	who	 is	a	 free‐rider.	The	reward	option	 in	Gürerk	et	al.	
(2014)	(third‐to‐last	bar)	is	very	popular	but	it	does	not	achieve	a	very	high	cooperation	
level,	arguably	because	free‐riders	do	not	face	an	explicit	risk	of	getting	punished	under	
this	institution.	
	
                                                            
6	Detailed	explanations	for	Figures	1‐4	are	provided	in	Table	S.5	in	the	Supplementary	Material.		
7	As	some	studies	may	include	end‐of‐game	effects,	we	prepared	the	same	figures	and	statistical	tests	us‐
ing	the	last	25	percent	of	rounds	rather	than	the	last	round	only.	These	figures	and	test	results	are	very	
similar	to	the	figures	and	results	presented	here.		
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Figure	1.	Overview	of	results	for	local	cooperation	and	voting	with	one’s	feet	
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Note:	Bars	represent	experimental	treatments	with	the	lower	(upper)	part	of	each	bar	showing	the	share	
of	 individuals	 inside	 (outside)	 the	 institution.	The	upper	 (lower)	panel	 shows	 institutional	 choice	when	
individuals	choose	the	first	(last)	time.	Colors	indicate	achieved	cooperation	rates.		
	
3.2	Local	cooperation	and	majority	voting	
Dal	Bó	et	al.	(2018)	let	groups	of	six	players	choose	between	a	prisoners’	dilemma	and	a	
modified	 game	 where	 payoffs	 are	 reduced	 in	 a	 way	 that	 cooperation	 becomes	 the	
dominant	strategy.	The	reduction	in	payoffs	can	be	interpreted	as	institutional	cost.	The	
costs	 imply	 that	 payoffs	 are	 potentially	 higher	 in	 the	 prisoners’	 dilemma	 but	 only	 if	
players	cooperate.	 In	equilibrium,	payoffs	are	higher	 in	 the	modified	game	than	 in	 the	
prisoners’	 dilemma	 because	 mutual	 cooperation	 in	 the	 modified	 game	 has	 higher	
payoffs	 than	mutual	 defection	 in	 the	prisoners’	 dilemma.	The	decision	which	 game	 to	
play	 is	made	by	majority	voting	or	by	one	randomly	selected	player.	Once	the	game	is	
chosen,	 it	 is	 played	 over	 five	 rounds	 in	 alternating	 pairwise	 interactions	 within	 the	
group	 so	 that	 every	 player	 interacts	 with	 each	 of	 the	 other	 players	 only	 once.	 The	
treatments	vary	in	the	decision	rule	and	the	game	played	before	the	players	vote.	Across	
all	treatments,	only	46	percent	of	players	vote	for	the	modified	game	despite	the	welfare	
increase	 in	equilibrium.	The	proportion	of	 groups	 that	play	 the	modified	game	ranges	
from	25	to	55	percent,	depending	on	treatment.	Cooperation	rates	in	the	modified	game	
are	very	high	throughout	all	rounds	(on	average	94‐98	percent)	compared	to	relatively	
low	cooperation	rates	in	the	prisoners’	dilemma	(on	average	15‐36	percent).	Payoffs	are	
also	 significantly	 higher	 in	 the	modified	 game.	 In	 one	 treatment	 (Majority	 Repeated),	
groups	 do	 not	 choose	 once‐for‐all	 but	 in	 every	 round.	Here,	 the	 proportion	 of	 groups	
that	play	the	modified	game	increases	from	55	to	90	percent.	The	average	cooperation	
rate	is	98	percent	in	the	modified	game	and	17	percent	in	the	prisoners’	dilemma.	This	
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results	shows	that	an	institutional	cost	can	make	a	strategically	advantageous	game	look	
unattractive	initially	but	players	can	learn	to	overcome	the	bias	over	time.	
In	a	similar	experiment	by	Dal	Bó	et	al.	(2010),	groups	of	four	players	choose	between	a	
prisoners’	 dilemma	 and	 a	 modified	 game	 in	 which	 a	 fine	 is	 imposed	 on	 unilateral	
defection,	 an	 off‐equilibrium	 change	 that	 makes	 mutual	 cooperation	 another	
equilibrium	 of	 the	 game	while	 leaving	 the	 payoffs	 to	mutual	 cooperation	 unchanged.	
Once	 a	 game	 is	 chosen	 by	 simple	 majority	 voting,	 it	 is	 played	 for	 ten	 rounds	 in	
alternating	pairwise	interactions	within	the	group.	Only	53	percent	of	the	players	vote	
for	 the	coordination	game	which	 leads	 to	significantly	higher	cooperation	rates.	 In	 the	
first	round	after	choosing,	72	percent	of	the	players	in	the	coordination	game	cooperate	
compared	to	only	18	percent	in	the	prisoners’	dilemma.	Since	there	is	no	treatment	with	
repeated	choice	we	do	not	know	how	players’	behavior	would	change	with	experience.	
Figure	 2	 summarizes	 the	 findings.	 As	 before,	 each	 bar	 represents	 one	 experimental	
treatment.	The	lower	part	is	the	share	of	groups	inside	the	institution,	the	upper	part	is	
the	share	of	groups	outside	the	institution,	and	the	colors	indicate	the	cooperation	rates	
inside	and	outside	the	institution.	The	upper	panel	shows	behavior	when	choosing	the	
first	time	and	the	lower	panel	shows	behavior	when	choosing	the	last	time.	Using	a	two‐
sided	 Wilcoxon	 signed‐rank	 test,	 we	 find	 that	 first	 round	 cooperation	 rates	 are	
significantly	 higher	 inside	 the	 institution	 than	 outside	 the	 institution	 (91	 versus	 30	
percent,	P	=	0.0625).	Unfortunately,	there	is	only	one	treatment	where	subjects	choose	
between	 games	 repeatedly	 (Dal	 Bó	 et	 al.,	 2018,	 Majority	 Repeated).	 This	 treatment	
shows	 that,	 with	 experience,	 many	 more	 subjects	 choose	 the	 institution	 than	 at	 the	
beginning.	Due	to	the	lack	of	observations,	we	are	unable	to	provide	statistical	tests	for	
the	last	round	and	for	the	changes	over	time.	
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Figure	2.	Overview	of	results	for	local	cooperation	and	majority	voting	
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Note:	Bars	represent	experimental	treatments	with	the	lower	(upper)	part	of	each	bar	showing	the	share	
of	groups	inside	(outside)	the	institution.	The	upper	(lower)	panel	shows	institutional	choice	when	groups	
choose	the	first	(last)	time.	Colors	indicate	achieved	cooperation	rates.		
	
3.3	Global	cooperation	and	voting	with	one’s	feet	
Before	we	start	describing	the	results	of	 the	studies	 in	this	category,	 it	 is	 important	to	
note	 that	 many	 of	 these	 studies	 fix	 the	 cooperation	 decisions	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	
institution	by	design	and	only	analyze	the	choice	of	the	institution.	For	instance,	players	
may	decide	whether	they	want	to	join	the	institution	or	not,	knowing	that	the	members	
of	 the	 institution	will	be	bound	 to	cooperate	while	 the	non‐members	will	be	bound	 to	
free‐ride.	Therefore,	the	difference	in	cooperation	between	members	and	non‐members	
occurs	merely	by	design	and	the	more	interesting	question	is	how	many	players	decide	
to	join	the	institution.		
Another	 important	 feature	 in	 many	 of	 these	 studies	 is	 the	 so‐called	 minimum	
participation	 threshold.	 The	 minimum	 participation	 threshold	 gives	 the	 minimum	
number	 of	 members	 that	 are	 needed	 for	 the	 institution	 to	 enter	 into	 force.	 If	 fewer	
players	 than	 this	minimum	number	 are	willing	 to	 enter,	 the	 institution	will	 not	 enter	
into	 force	 and	 the	 players	 will	 play	 the	 cooperation	 game	 without	 institution.	 The	
minimum	participation	threshold	typically	is	the	smallest	number	of	members	for	which	
the	 institution	 is	 profitable	 compared	 to	 the	 situation	 without	 institution.	 However,	
experimenters	 sometimes	 set	 the	 minimum	 participation	 threshold	 higher	 or	 let	 the	
players	 choose	 the	 threshold	 in	 order	 to	 test	 how	 the	 minimum	 threshold	 affects	
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institutional	choice.	In	this	setting,	theory	predicts	that	an	individual	joins	the	institution	
if	 she	 is	 pivotal	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 institution	 and	 she	 does	 not	 join	 otherwise.	
Thus,	the	minimum	participation	threshold	should	be	met	just	and	the	institution	should	
always	form.	The	reason	for	this	is	that,	even	though	members	by	design	earn	less	than	
non‐members,	 they	 still	 earn	 more	 with	 the	 institution	 in	 place	 than	 without	 the	
institution.	To	coordinate	the	process	on	who	joins	and	who	does	not,	the	experiments	
typically	 include	 a	 coordination	 mechanism	 like,	 for	 example,	 real‐time	 information	
about	 participation	 decisions	 (McEvoy	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 sequential	 participation	 decisions	
(McEvoy	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 or	 an	 additional	 stage	 in	which	members,	 after	 being	 informed	
about	 the	 number	 of	 members,	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 implement	 the	 institution	
(Kosfeld	et	al.,	2009).		
McEvoy	et	al.	 (2011)	consider	groups	of	 ten	players	who	play	a	repeated	public	goods	
game	with	 reshuffling	 of	 groups	 between	 rounds.	 In	 every	 round,	 players	 can	 choose	
whether	 they	 want	 to	 become	 a	 member	 of	 an	 institution	 or	 not,	 knowing	 that	 the	
members	 will	 be	 punished	 for	 not	 contributing	 fully	 to	 the	 public	 good	 (with	 some	
probability)	while	non‐members	will	be	bound	to	contribute	zero	and	not	be	punished.	
The	minimum	participation	threshold	is	either	six	or	ten,	depending	on	treatment.	When	
six	 players	 are	 required	 for	 the	 institution	 to	 form,	 73	 percent	 of	 players	 join	 the	
institution	 when	 choosing	 the	 first	 time	 and	 83	 percent	 of	 them	 comply.	 In	 the	 last	
round,	65	percent	of	players	join	the	institution	and	62	percent	of	them	comply.	When	
all	 players	 are	 required	 for	 the	 institution	 to	 form,	 98	 percent	 of	 players	 join	 the	
institution	 when	 choosing	 the	 first	 time	 and	 87	 percent	 of	 them	 comply.	 In	 the	 last	
round,	93	percent	of	players	join	the	institution	and	63	percent	of	them	comply.	It	is	not	
clear	why	a	significant	share	of	 the	members	of	 the	 institution	chooses	not	 to	comply,	
especially	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 game.	 One	 potential	 reason	 is	 that	 the	 punishment,	
while	deterrent,	is	enforced	only	with	80	percent	probability	and	thus	some	players	may	
prefer	to	gamble.	
Gerber	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 also	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 an	 exogenously	 given	 minimum	
participation	 threshold	 on	 institutional	 choice	 in	 a	 repeated	 public	 goods	 game.	
Depending	on	treatment,	the	formation	of	the	institution	requires	either	all	four	players	
or	only	 three	out	of	 four	players	 to	 join	 the	 institution.	Members	of	 the	 institution	are	
forced	to	contribute	the	full	amount	to	the	public	good	while	non‐members	are	free	in	
their	 choice.	 When	 all	 players	 are	 required	 to	 join	 the	 institution,	 the	 institution	 is	
implemented	in	41	percent	of	cases	in	the	first	round.	Members	are	bound	to	contribute	
the	 full	 amount	 to	 the	public	 good	while	 the	 groups	without	 institution	 contribute	26	
percent	 on	 average.	 Behavior	 in	 the	 last	 round	 is	 similar	 with	 participation	 in	 the	
institution	being	somewhat	higher	(59	percent).	When	only	three	players	are	required	
to	 join,	 the	 institution	 forms	 in	 63	 percent	 of	 cases	 in	 the	 first	 round.	 Most	 of	 these	
institutions	have	 three	members	who	are	 forced	 to	 contribute	 fully.	The	 subjects	who	
are	 outside	 the	 institution,	 either	 because	 the	 institution	 has	 not	 formed	 or	 because	
these	subjects	have	not	joined	the	institution,	contribute	on	average	24	percent.	In	this	
treatment,	participation	in	the	institution	even	decreases	over	time	to	33	percent	in	the	
last	round.	
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Kosfeld	et	al.	 (2009)	study	institution	formation	in	a	repeated	public	goods	game	with	
either	high	or	 low	marginal	per	 capita	 return	 to	 the	public	 good.	Playing	 in	 groups	of	
four	players,	players	first	decide	whether	they	are	willing	to	join	the	institution	or	not.	
After	being	informed	about	the	number	of	potential	members,	these	potential	members	
decide	whether	they	want	to	implement	the	institution	or	not	with	unanimity	rule.	If	the	
institution	is	implemented,	members	are	forced	to	contribute	the	full	amount	to	public	
good	while	non‐members	are	free	in	their	choice.	With	low	marginal	per	capita	return	to	
the	public	good,	the	institution	is	implemented	43	percent	of	the	time	on	average	and,	in	
83	 percent	 of	 them,	 participation	 is	 full.	With	 high	marginal	 return,	 the	 institution	 is	
implemented	61	percent	of	the	time	on	average	and,	in	69	percent	of	them,	participation	
is	full.	Institutions	with	less	than	full	participation	are	often	rejected	by	the	players,	even	
when	they	are	profitable.	Importantly,	the	tendency	to	reject	profitable	institutions	with	
less	 than	 full	 participation	 does	 not	 decrease	 but	 rather	 increases	 over	 time.	 The	
increase	in	the	number	of	implemented	institutions	over	time	is	exclusively	driven	by	an	
increase	in	institutions	with	full	participation.	
In	a	similar	study,	McEvoy	et	al.	(2015)	investigate	institutional	choice	in	a	repeated	six‐
player	 public	 goods	 game	 in	 which	 the	 players	 themselves	 determine	 the	 minimum	
participation	threshold	via	voting	in	a	pre‐stage.	Members	of	the	institution	are	forced	to	
contribute	 the	 full	 amount	 to	 the	 public	 good	 while	 non‐members	 are	 forced	 to	
contribute	zero.	The	majority	of	players	vote	in	favor	of	the	full	and	efficient	minimum	
participation	 threshold	 so	 that	 this	minimum	 threshold	 is	 implemented	 77	 percent	 of	
the	time	across	all	rounds.	In	those	cases,	the	institution	forms	91	percent	of	the	time.	
Institutions	with	less	than	full	participation	are	rarely	proposed	and	adopted.	
Dannenberg	et	al.	(2014)	employ	a	repeated	non‐linear	public	goods	game	with	interior	
solutions	in	which	each	of	ten	players	can	decide	whether	to	join	an	institution	or	not.	
They	compare	an	 institution	 in	which	 the	members	are	 forced	 to	maximize	 their	 joint	
payoff	 and	 an	 institution	 in	 which	 the	 members	 can	 determine	 their	 contributions	
endogenously	 by	 a	 smallest‐common‐denominator	 rule.	 When	 the	 institution	 forces	
members	 to	maximize	 their	 joint	 payoff,	 40	 percent	 of	 players	 are	willing	 to	 join	 the	
institution	initially	and	this	percentage	decreases	to	29	percent	by	the	final	round.	When	
members	 can	 determine	 their	 contributions	 endogenously,	 64	 percent	 of	 players	 are	
willing	to	join	the	institution	at	the	beginning	which	decreases	to	48	percent	by	the	final	
round.	 In	 those	 cases,	 the	 members	 choose	 a	 lower	 than	 optimal	 contribution	 level	
which	 limits	 the	 payoff	 advantage	 of	 the	 non‐members.	 In	 both	 treatments,	 non‐
members	 contribute	 significantly	 less	on	average	 than	 the	members	of	 the	 institution.	
Similar	results	have	been	found	by	Dannenberg	(2012).	
Taken	together,	even	though	theory	predicts	that	the	institution	is	adopted	whenever	it	
is	profitable	to	do	so,	this	does	not	always	happen	in	the	experiments.	The	institution	is	
much	more	likely	to	be	implemented	if	it	applies	to	all	players	and	not	only	a	subset	of	
players.	 If	 they	 have	 the	 possibility,	 players	 attempt	 to	 implement	 an	 institution	 that	
covers	 all	 players	 either	 by	 voting	 for	 the	 full	minimum	participation	 threshold	 or	 by	
rejecting	smaller	institutions.		
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Figure	3	presents	an	overview	of	these	findings	in	the	same	manner	as	before.	Each	bar	
represents	one	experimental	treatment,	the	lower	part	is	the	share	of	individuals	inside	
the	institution,	the	upper	part	is	the	share	of	individuals	outside	the	institution,	and	the	
colors	indicate	the	cooperation	rates	inside	and	outside	the	institution.	The	upper	panel	
shows	behavior	when	choosing	the	first	time	and	the	lower	panel	shows	behavior	when	
choosing	the	last	time.	The	figure	shows	that	behavior	in	the	studies	in	this	category	is	
quite	different	from	the	behavior	described	above.	Cooperation	rates	are	higher	 inside	
the	 institution	 than	 outside	 the	 institution	 both	 in	 the	 first	 round	 (85	 vs.	 18	 percent,	
P	=	0.0017,	two‐sided	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test)	and	in	the	last	round	(75	vs.	8	percent,	
P	=	0.0017).	Cooperation	rates	 inside	and	outside	the	 institution	decrease	slightly	over	
time.	 However,	 most	 of	 this	 occurs	 by	 design	 and	 is	 thus	 not	 very	 interesting.	 More	
interesting	is	that,	across	all	studies	and	treatments	shown	in	the	figure,	participation	in	
the	institution	does	not	increase	over	time:	51	percent	of	players	opt	for	the	institution	
when	 choosing	 the	 first	 time	 and	 49	 percent	 opt	 for	 it	 when	 choosing	 the	 last	 time	
(P	=	0.6659).	The	exception	is	the	study	by	Kosfeld	et	al.	(2009),	and	to	a	smaller	degree	
Gerber	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 but	 even	 here	 participation	 in	 the	 final	 round	 is	 only	 about	 50	
percent.	
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Figure	3.	Overview	of	results	for	global	cooperation	and	voting	with	one’s	feet	
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Note:	Bars	represent	experimental	treatments	with	the	lower	(upper)	part	of	each	bar	showing	the	share	
of	 individuals	 inside	 (outside)	 the	 institution.	The	upper	 (lower)	panel	 shows	 institutional	 choice	when	
individuals	choose	the	first	(last)	time.	Colors	indicate	achieved	cooperation	rates.		
	
3.4	Global	cooperation	and	majority	voting	
In	this	category,	 there	are	a	number	of	public	goods	experiments	that	allow	players	to	
propose	a	group‐wide	contribution	level	and	then	vote	on	the	proposals	to	determine	a	
binding	level	for	the	entire	group.	In	this	case,	players	have	a	weakly	dominant	strategy	
to	propose	and	implement	the	efficient	amount	as	a	binding	level	 for	the	group.	 In	the	
repeated	public	goods	experiment	by	Kroll	et	al.	(2007),	where	majority	voting	is	used	
to	 select	 from	 the	 proposed	 contribution	 levels,	 almost	 all	 groups	 implement	 the	
efficient	level	towards	the	end	of	the	game.	Similar	results	are	provided	by	Bernard	et	al.	
(2013)	 who	 study	 a	 repeated	 common	 pool	 resource	 game	 in	 which	 players	 can	
implement	 a	 binding	 group‐wide	 extraction	 level.	 In	 the	 repeated	 public	 goods	
experiment	 by	 Dannenberg	 et	 al.	 (2014),	 all	 players	 make	 proposals	 for	 a	 minimum	
contribution	 level,	 and	 then	 the	 smallest	 proposal	 becomes	 the	 binding	 minimum	
contribution	 level	 for	 everyone.	 This	 mechanism	 is	 very	 sensitive	 to	 the	 player	 who	
makes	the	smallest	proposal	and	so	groups	fare	very	differently.	Sixty	percent	of	groups	
have	an	increasing	minimum	level	over	time	that	approaches	the	social	optimum	at	the	
end.	 The	 other	 40	 percent,	 however,	 implement	 a	 low	minimum	 level	 throughout	 the	
game	which	also	leads	to	very	low	contributions.	
In	other	public	goods	or	common	pool	resource	experiments,	players	do	not	propose	a	
group‐wide	 contribution	 or	 extraction	 level	 but	 instead	 a	 level	 for	 each	player.	 In	 the	
common	 pool	 resource	 games	 by	 Walker	 et	 al.	 (2000)	 and	 Margreiter	 et	 al.	 (2005),	
players	repeatedly	propose	individual	extraction	rates	for	every	member	of	their	group	
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and	 then	 vote	 on	 the	 proposed	 allocation	 rules,	 using	 either	 majority	 or	 unanimity	
voting.	 If	 an	 allocation	 rule	 is	 adopted	 by	 the	 group,	 the	 allocations	 are	 automatically	
imposed	on	all	members.	If	no	rule	is	adopted,	participants	play	the	standard	version	of	
the	 game.	 In	 this	 setting,	 players	 have	 a	 weakly	 dominant	 strategy	 to	 propose	 an	
allocation	rule	that	assigns	strictly	positive	extraction	levels	to	sufficiently	many	players,	
i.e.	 the	majority	 under	majority	 voting	 and	 all	 players	 under	 unanimity.	Walker	 et	 al.	
(2000)	find	that	a	proposal	is	adopted	in	44	percent	of	times	across	all	rounds.	It	is	not	
clear	 why	 proposals	 are	 not	 adopted	 more	 frequently,	 but	 arguably	 the	 very	 high	
number	 of	 possible	 proposals	 makes	 coordination	 and	 agreement	 among	 group	
members	difficult.	Of	 the	 adopted	proposals,	 58	percent	 require	 symmetric	 extraction	
levels	 across	 all	 players	 and	 89	 percent	 out	 of	 those	 are	 socially	 optimal.	 Thus,	
symmetric	and	efficient	proposals	are	the	most	focal	ones	that	have	the	best	chances	of	
being	implemented.	The	number	of	these	proposals	and	their	implementation	increases	
over	time.	With	this,	the	common	pool	resource	is	more	efficiently	used	when	a	proposal	
is	 adopted	 than	when	no	proposal	 is	 adopted.	Margreiter	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 investigate	 the	
effect	of	asymmetric	costs	of	appropriating	the	common	pool	resource.	Therefore,	high‐
cost	players	appropriate	less	than	low‐cost	players,	both	in	the	Nash	equilibrium	and	the	
social	 optimum.	 They	 show	 that	 in	 homogeneous	 groups	 a	 proposal	 is	 adopted	 in	 61	
percent	of	all	cases.	In	heterogeneous	groups,	a	proposal	is	only	adopted	in	32	percent	of	
all	 cases.	The	percentage	of	 socially	optimal	proposals	among	all	 adopted	proposals	 is	
similarly	high	in	both	homogeneous	groups	(87	percent)	and	heterogeneous	groups	(93	
percent).	
The	experiments	described	 so	 far	 that	 study	 the	adoption	of	 group‐wide	or	 individual	
allocation	rules	are	not	included	in	Figure	4	below	because	groups	do	not	only	differ	in	
whether	 they	 adopt	 an	 allocation	 rule	 or	 not,	 but	 also	 in	 which	 allocation	 rule	 they	
adopt.	For	this	reason,	a	simple	comparison	between	groups	with	institution	and	groups	
without	institution	is	not	possible.	
In	 the	experiments	of	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2003)	and	(2004),	groups	decide	
repeatedly	whether	to	implement	a	binding	minimum	contribution	level	in	a	non‐linear	
public	 goods	 game	 with	 interior	 solutions.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 studies	 above,	 the	 binding	
minimum	 contribution	 level	 is	 pre‐specified	 by	 design	 and	 players	 can	 only	 decide	
whether	 they	 want	 to	 implement	 it	 or	 not.	 In	 Sutter	 and	 Weck‐Hannemann	 (2003),	
players	decide	whether	or	not	 to	 implement	asymmetric	minimum	contribution	 levels	
that,	 if	 implemented,	 imply	 relatively	 high	 obligations	 for	 some	players	 and	 relatively	
low	obligations	 for	others.	Either	way,	 the	obligations	are	below	the	Nash	equilibrium	
and	do	not	affect	players’	free‐riding	incentives.	Across	all	rounds,	about	80	percent	of	
groups	 implement	 the	 institution,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	 in	 average	
cooperation	rates	between	groups	that	implement	the	institution	(8	percent)	and	groups	
that	 do	 not	 implement	 the	 institution	 (‐3	 percent).8	 The	 proportion	 of	 groups	
implementing	 the	 institution	and	the	cooperation	rates	are	relatively	stable	over	 time.	
                                                            
8	Cooperation	rates	in	non‐linear	public	goods	games	with	interior	solutions	can	be	negative	because	we	
adjust	the	calculations	so	that	a	contribution	at	the	Nash	equilibrium	level	is	set	to	0	percent	and	a	contri‐
bution	at	the	socially	optimal	level	is	set	to	100	percent	(equivalent	to	linear	public	goods	game).	Contri‐
butions	below	the	Nash	equilibrium	level	are	therefore	negative.	
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Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2004)	consider	symmetric	minimum	contribution	levels	
which	are	either	slightly	below	or	slightly	above	the	Nash	equilibrium.	In	both	cases,	the	
institution	 is	 relatively	 popular:	 it	 is	 implemented	 by	 78	 percent	 of	 groups	when	 the	
level	 is	below	 the	Nash	equilibrium	and	by	68	percent	of	groups	when	 it	 is	above	 the	
Nash	 equilibrium.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 groups	 that	 implement	 the	minimum	 contribute	
more	to	the	public	good	than	the	other	groups.	The	proportion	of	groups	that	implement	
the	 institution	 increases	 slightly	 over	 time	 while	 the	 cooperation	 rates	 are	 relatively	
stable	both	inside	and	outside	the	institution.	
Kocher	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 also	 study	 the	 adoption	 of	 pre‐specified	 minimum	 contribution	
levels,	using	a	linear	one‐shot	public	goods	game.	One	treatment	allows	for	adoption	of	a	
low	 minimum	 level	 (10	 percent	 of	 endowment)	 and	 the	 other	 treatment	 allows	 for	
adoption	of	a	high	minimum	level	(35	percent).	Both	minimum	levels	are	above	the	Nash	
equilibrium	 but	 below	 the	 social	 optimum,	 each	 compared	 to	 a	 standard	 voluntary	
contribution	 mechanism.	 Players	 first	 vote	 in	 favor	 or	 against	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	
minimum	contribution	 level	 and	 then	make	a	 contribution	decision	 for	both	with	 and	
without	minimum	level	(strategy	method).	In	the	end,	the	vote	of	one	randomly	selected	
player	 is	 implemented	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 minimum	 contribution	 level	 is	
implemented	or	not.	In	this	setting,	players	have	a	dominant	strategy	to	vote	in	favor	of	
the	minimum	contribution	 level	and,	 if	 it	 is	 implemented,	 to	 contribute	exactly	at	 that	
level.	The	results	show	that	67	percent	of	players	vote	in	favor	of	the	low	minimum	level	
and	a	large	majority	of	88	percent	of	players	vote	in	favor	of	the	high	minimum	level.	In	
case	of	the	low	minimum,	there	is	no	difference	in	contributions	when	the	minimum	is	
implemented	and	when	it	is	not	implemented	(33	versus	34	percent).	In	case	of	the	high	
minimum,	contributions	are	higher	when	the	minimum	is	implemented	than	when	it	is	
not	 implemented	 (51	versus	 31	percent).9	 Similar	 results	 are	 provided	by	Martinsson	
and	 Persson	 (2019)	 who	 study	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 pre‐specified	 25‐percent	 minimum	
contribution	level	in	a	linear	public	goods	game.	
Andreoni	and	Gee	(2012)	 let	groups	 first	play	a	standard	public	goods	game	and	 then	
provide	 them	with	 the	opportunity	 to	 implement	a	 formal	punishment	 institution	 that	
punishes	 the	 lowest	 contributor	 and	 makes	 full	 contributions	 the	 unique	 Nash	
equilibrium.	In	groups	of	four,	players	receive	an	additional	endowment	in	a	pre‐stage	
and	decide	how	much	they	want	to	invest	in	the	punishment	institution.	If	the	aggregate	
investment	reaches	a	certain	threshold,	the	institution	is	implemented	for	the	remaining	
rounds;	otherwise	investments	are	refunded	and	players	play	the	standard	public	goods	
game.	 Across	 all	 rounds,	 85	 percent	 of	 groups	 implement	 the	 punishment	 institution.	
Both	contributions	and	payoffs	are	significantly	higher	in	the	groups	that	implement	the	
punishment	 institution	 than	 in	 the	 other	 groups,	 even	 when	 the	 institutional	 cost	 is	
taken	into	account.		
                                                            
9	As	Kocher	et	al.	 (2016)	use	the	strategy	method	to	elicit	contribution	decisions,	average	contributions	
include	 the	decisions	by	all	players	and	not	 just	 the	groups	 that	do	or	do	not	 implement	 the	minimum	
level.	It	is	not	clear	if	and	how	the	strategy	method	changes	behavior	in	this	context.	We	are	not	aware	of	a	
study	that	compares	behavior	under	the	strategy	and	direct‐response	method	for	endogenous	institution‐
al	choice.	For	a	general	overview	on	this	topic,	see	Brandts	and	Charness	(2011).	
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In	the	experiment	by	Barrett	and	Dannenberg	(2017),	groups	consisting	of	five	players	
choose	to	play	either	a	prisoners’	dilemma	or	a	modified	game	where	both	full	defection	
and	full	cooperation	are	Nash	equilibria.	In	the	first	treatment,	there	is	no	institutional	
cost,	meaning	that	payoffs	to	both	full	defection	and	full	cooperation	are	the	same	as	in	
the	 original	 prisoners’	 dilemma.	 In	 the	 second	 treatment,	 playing	 the	 modified	 game	
comes	at	a	fixed	cost,	meaning	that	full	defection	has	the	same	payoffs	as	in	the	original	
prisoners’	dilemma	but	the	payoffs	to	full	cooperation	are	lower.	The	experiment	shows	
that,	in	both	treatments,	cooperation	and	payoffs	are	significantly	higher	in	the	modified	
game	but	participation	is	very	different.	Without	institutional	cost,	about	half	the	groups	
choose	the	modified	game	in	the	first	round.	This	proportion	jumps	to	100	percent	when	
groups	 choose	 a	 second	 time	 and	 stays	 there	 for	 the	 remaining	 rounds.	 With	
institutional	cost,	all	groups	start	by	choosing	the	prisoners’	dilemma	and	only	half	the	
groups	switch	to	the	modified	game	over	the	course	of	the	game.	
Feld	and	Tyran	(2002)	let	groups	choose	between	a	standard	public	goods	game	and	a	
public	 goods	 game	 in	 which	 contributing	 less	 than	 the	 full	 amount	 is	 automatically	
punished.	The	punishment	is	non‐deterrent	and	zero	contribution	remains	the	dominant	
strategy.	Groups	consist	of	three	players	and	they	use	majority	voting	to	determine	the	
game	they	will	play	for	one	round	after	choosing.	Using	the	strategy	method,	players	are	
asked	 to	make	contribution	decisions	contingent	on	all	possible	distributions	of	votes.	
The	authors	find	that	half	the	players	vote	for	the	game	with	non‐deterrent	punishment	
and	 the	 other	 half	 vote	 against	 it.	 The	 average	 contribution	 rate	 with	 non‐deterrent	
punishment	 is	 71	 percent	 compared	 to	 24	 percent	 in	 the	 standard	 game.	 Average	
payoffs	 are	 slightly	 higher	 in	 the	 game	 with	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 than	 in	 the	
standard	game.	
In	a	follow‐up	study,	Tyran	and	Feld	(2006)	compare	the	adoption	of	a	deterrent	and	a	
non‐deterrent	 punishment	 institution,	 each	 relative	 to	 a	 standard	 public	 goods	 game	
without	 punishment.	 As	 before,	 punishment	 is	 automatically	 enforced	 if	 players	
contribute	less	than	the	full	amount.	With	deterrent	punishment,	cooperation	becomes	
the	 dominant	 strategy	 while	 with	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 free‐riding	 remains	 the	
dominant	 strategy.	 They	 find,	 that	 75	 percent	 of	 players	 vote	 for	 the	 game	 with	
punishment	when	 punishment	 is	 deterrent	 and	 50	 percent	when	 punishment	 is	 non‐
deterrent.	 Using	 the	 strategy	 method,	 they	 find	 that	 with	 deterrent	 punishment	 the	
average	 contribution	rate	 is	96	percent	versus	15	percent	 in	 the	 standard	game.	With	
non‐deterrent	 punishment,	 players	 contribute	 on	 average	 64	 percent	 of	 their	
endowment	 compared	 to	 22	 percent	 in	 the	 standard	 game.	 Average	 payoffs	 are	 also	
higher	 in	 the	 game	 with	 deterrent	 or	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 compared	 to	 the	
standard	game.	Vollan	et	al.	(2017)	use	a	similar	setup	and	let	samples	of	students	and	
workers	 in	China	 choose	between	a	public	 goods	game	with	or	without	a	 formal	non‐
deterrent	 punishment	 scheme	 and	 make	 contribution	 decisions	 for	 all	 possible	
outcomes	(strategy	method).	They	find	that	42	percent	of	players	vote	for	the	game	with	
punishment.	With	punishment,	the	average	contribution	rate	is	59	percent	compared	to	
38	percent	 in	 the	standard	game.	Average	payoffs,	however,	do	not	differ	between	the	
game	with	 punishment	 and	 the	 standard	 game.	 For	 the	 same	 type	 of	 institution,	 but	
using	 German	 students	 and	 the	 direct‐response	 method,	 Gallier	 (2017)	 finds	 that	 73	
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percent	of	 the	players	vote	 for	 the	public	goods	game	with	non‐deterrent	punishment	
and	 27	 percent	 vote	 for	 the	 standard	 game.	 Average	 contributions	 are	 significantly	
higher	 in	 the	 groups	 with	 punishment	 than	 in	 the	 groups	 without	 punishment	 (61	
versus	14	percent),	and	also	average	payoffs	are	significantly	higher.		
Dannenberg	et	al.	(2019)	let	groups	repeatedly	choose	between	a	standard	public	goods	
game	and	a	modified	version	in	which	players	can	vote	to	exclude	another	player.	The	
treatments	differ	 in	whether	 the	exclusion	option	 involves	a	 fixed	cost	or	not.	 In	both	
conditions,	 cooperation	 is	 higher	 with	 exclusion	 institution	 than	 without.	 The	
differences	in	cooperation	increase	over	time,	except	of	the	last	round	when	exclusion	is	
no	 longer	possible	and	both	games	have	a	 similarly	 low	cooperation	 level.	Payoffs	are	
higher	with	the	institution,	too,	but	only	when	it	does	not	involve	a	cost.	In	this	case,	the	
share	of	groups	that	implement	the	institution	rises	from	30	percent	to	96	percent.	With	
institutional	cost,	the	share	rises	from	4	percent	to	52	percent.	
Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 let	 groups	 choose	 between	 three	 different	 games,	 namely	 (i)	 a	
standard	public	goods	game,	(ii)	a	public	goods	game	with	informal	punishment	option,	
and	 (iii)	 a	 public	 goods	 game	 with	 informal	 reward	 option.	 In	 one	 treatment,	 the	
leverage	 of	 the	 punishment	 and	 reward	 option	 is	 low	 meaning	 that	 reducing	 or	
increasing	another	player’s	payoff	is	relatively	expensive,	and	in	a	second	treatment,	the	
leverage	 is	 high	 meaning	 that	 it	 is	 relatively	 cheap	 to	 decrease	 or	 increase	 another	
player’s	payoff.	Groups	vote	until	unanimity	is	reached	and	the	selected	game	is	played	
for	ten	rounds.	With	 low	leverage,	62	percent	of	groups	choose	the	standard	game,	25	
percent	 choose	 the	 game	 with	 reward	 option,	 and	 13	 percent	 choose	 the	 game	 with	
punishment	option.	Average	contribution	rates	are	the	other	way	around:	27	percent	of	
the	endowment	in	the	standard	game,	43	percent	in	the	reward	game,	and	81	percent	in	
the	punishment	game.	The	same	order	holds	 for	average	payoffs.	Thus,	 the	game	with	
the	highest	cooperation	and	efficiency	 is	 the	 least	popular	one.	With	high	 leverage,	85	
percent	 of	 groups	 choose	 the	 game	 with	 reward	 option	 and	 15	 percent	 choose	 the	
standard	game.	Both	average	contributions	and	payoffs	are	higher	in	the	reward	game	
than	 in	 the	 standard	 game.	 Note	 that	 by	 design	 the	 maximally	 possible	 payoffs	 are	
higher	in	the	reward	game	because	players	can	increase	the	pie	by	rewarding	others.	No	
group	chooses	the	punishment	game	arguably	because	of	the	very	attractive	alternative.		
In	the	experiment	by	Ostrom	et	al.	(1992),	groups	choose	once	whether	they	want	to	add	
an	 informal	 punishment	 option	 to	 a	 common	 pool	 resource	 game.	 They	 find	 that	 66	
percent	of	groups	decide	to	add	the	punishment	option	to	the	game.	When	groups	adopt	
the	 punishment	 option,	 the	 average	 efficiency	 rate	 reaches	 89	 percent.	 This	 rate	
decreases	only	slightly	to	84	percent	when	the	costs	of	fees	and	fines	are	subtracted.	In	
contrast,	when	groups	do	not	adopt	the	punishment	option,	the	average	efficiency	rate	is	
28	percent.10		
                                                            
10	As	 for	non‐linear	public	goods	games,	we	have	adjusted	the	calculation	of	efficiency	rates	 in	common	
pool	resource	games	with	interior	solutions,	so	that	the	payoff	 level	in	the	Nash	equilibrium	has	an	effi‐
ciency	rate	of	0	percent	and	the	payoff	level	in	the	social	optimum	has	an	efficiency	rate	of	100	percent.	
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Ertan	et	al.	(2009)	allow	groups	not	only	to	choose	between	punishment	option	and	no	
punishment	option	but	also	which	contribution	behavior,	if	any,	can	be	punished	(below	
average,	average,	above	average).	Groups	use	majority	voting	and	have	the	opportunity	
to	change	the	institution	over	the	course	of	the	game.	The	two	treatments	differ	in	the	
experience	players	have	before	they	vote	the	first	time	and	the	number	of	voting	rounds.	
At	 the	beginning,	many	groups	prohibit	any	punishment	(50	and	65	percent)	but	over	
time	they	change	the	institutional	setting	to	allow	for	punishment	of	low	contributions.	
At	 the	 end,	 a	 large	majority	 of	 85	 and	90	percent	 of	 groups	 implement	 a	 punishment	
scheme	 that	 allows	 for	 punishing	 below‐average	 contributions.	 From	 the	 beginning,	
contributions	 and	 payoffs	 are	 higher	 with	 punishment	 option	 than	 without,	 and	 the	
difference	 becomes	 larger	 over	 time.	 Similar	 results	 for	 heterogeneous	 groups	 are	
provided	by	Noussair	and	Tan	(2011).	
The	groups	in	the	experiment	by	Markussen	et	al.	(2014)	choose	repeatedly	between	a	
standard	public	goods	game,	a	public	goods	game	with	formal	punishment,	and	a	public	
goods	game	with	an	informal	punishment	option.	To	avoid	strategic	voting,	players	only	
choose	between	two	institutions	at	a	time.	When	choosing	between	the	standard	game	
and	an	informal	punishment	option,	only	between	14	and	25	percent	of	groups	choose	
the	punishment	option	at	the	beginning	but	the	proportion	increases	to	50	to	67	percent	
when	groups	choose	a	second	time.	Average	contribution	rates	and	payoffs	are	higher	
with	 punishment	 option	 than	without	 and	 this	 difference	 becomes	more	 pronounced	
over	time.	The	popularity	of	 the	 formal	punishment	scheme	depends	on	the	cost	of	 its	
implementation	and	whether	or	not	it	is	deterrent.	Compared	to	the	standard	game,	the	
cheap	and	deterrent	punishment	scheme	is	popular	from	the	start,	about	71	percent	of	
groups	 choose	 it	 the	 first	 time	 and	 about	 86	 percent	 the	 second	 time,	 and	 it	 leads	 to	
higher	contributions	and	payoffs	than	the	standard	game.	When	the	punishment	scheme	
is	cheap	and	non‐deterrent,	about	58	percent	of	groups	choose	it	the	first	time	and	about	
43	percent	 the	second	time,	and	 it	also	 leads	 to	higher	contributions	and	payoffs	 than	
the	standard	game.	The	punishment	scheme	is	less	popular	when	it	is	expensive.	When	
the	punishment	scheme	is	expensive	and	deterrent,	17	percent	of	groups	choose	it	at	the	
beginning	 and	 the	proportion	 rises	 to	 33	percent	when	 groups	 choose	 a	 second	 time.	
Contributions	are	higher	on	average	than	in	the	standard	game	but	payoffs	are	about	the	
same	on	average	because	of	 the	 institutional	 cost.	 Very	 few	groups	 choose	 the	 formal	
punishment	 scheme	when	 it	 is	 expensive	and	non‐deterrent.	 Similar	 results	 about	 the	
popularity	of	 formal	and	 informal	punishment	 institutions	are	obtained	 in	a	 follow‐up	
study	by	Kamei	et	al.	(2015).11	
Figure	4	provides	an	overview	of	these	findings	in	the	same	form	as	before.	The	lower	
and	upper	part	of	 the	bars	show	the	groups	 inside	and	outside	 the	 institution	and	the	
colors	indicate	the	cooperation	rates.	Only	about	half	the	studies	include	repeated	choice	
and	thus	allow	for	a	comparison	of	behavior	at	the	beginning	and	at	the	end	of	the	game.	
The	 comparison	 shows	 that,	 similar	 to	 the	 results	 shown	 in	 Figures	 1	 and	 2,	 average	
cooperation	rates	are	significantly	higher	inside	the	institution	than	outside	institution	
                                                            
11	Gross	et	al.	(2016)	investigate	players’	willingness	to	transfer	their	right	to	punish	other	players	within	
an	informal	punishment	institution.	A	significant	share	of	players	is	willing	to	transfer	the	right	to	other	
players	and	over	time	the	right	to	punish	others	is	increasingly	centralized	on	individual	group	members.			
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both	 at	 the	 beginning	 (70	 versus	 41	 percent,	 P	<	0.0001,	 two‐sided	Wilcoxon	 signed‐
rank	 test)	 and	 at	 the	 end	 (64	 versus	 16	 percent,	 P	=	0.0004)	 of	 the	 game.	 Average	
cooperation	inside	the	institution	decreases	slightly	from	the	first	to	the	last	round	(70	
versus	 64	 percent,	 P	=	0.4076),	 but	 cooperation	 outside	 the	 institution	 decreases	
significantly	(41	versus	16	percent,	P	=	0.0010).	Participation	in	the	institution	increases	
significantly	over	time	(48	versus	66	percent,	P	=	0.0005).	The	increase	in	participation	
over	 time	 is	particularly	 large	 for	 the	 institutions	 that	do	not	 involve	 a	 fixed	 cost	 and	
eliminate	 free‐riding	 incentives	 (the	 first	 eight	 bars	 on	 the	 left	 in	 the	 lower	 panel).	
Participation	in	the	study	by	Markussen	et	al.	(2014)	is	still	only	about	50	percent,	but	
players	 in	 this	 experiment	 choose	 between	 the	 same	 two	 institutions	 only	 twice.	We	
could	speculate	that	participation	would	have	increased	by	more	if	players	had	chosen	
more	often.	All	other	institutions	in	the	lower	panel	(the	nine	bars	to	the	right)	involve	a	
fixed	 cost	 or	 do	 not	 eliminate	 free‐riding	 incentives.	 In	 these	 cases,	 increases	 in	
participation	and	cooperation	in	the	institution	over	time	tend	to	be	small.	
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3.5	Summary	
The	 studies	 provide	 strong	 and	 robust	 evidence	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 individuals	 and	
groups	 who	 adopt	 the	 institution	 behave	 more	 cooperatively	 than	 those	 who	 do	 not	
adopt	the	institution.	The	difference	exists	in	the	first	round	already	and	often	increases	
over	 time	 because	 cooperation	 outside	 the	 institution	 typically	 decreases	 over	 time	
while	cooperation	inside	the	institution	is	stable	or	even	increases.	
On	institutional	choice,	a	natural	presumption	is	that	subjects	are	more	likely	to	adopt	
the	 institution	 when	 theory	 predicts	 that	 it	 is	 profitable	 to	 do	 so.	 However,	 this	
presumption	 is	 not	 confirmed	 by	 the	 experimental	 data.	 Even	 when	 the	 institution	
makes	cooperation	the	dominant	strategy,	the	number	of	subjects	who	vote	in	favor	of	
the	 institution	 is	 surprisingly	 low	when	 they	vote	 for	 the	 first	 time.	Across	 all	 studies	
and	treatments,	the	proportion	of	individuals	or	groups	that	adopt	the	institution	often	
lies	in	the	range	between	one‐third	and	two‐thirds	when	they	vote	for	the	first	time.	In	
many	studies,	the	proportion	is	close	to	50	percent	so	that	one	could	think	that	subjects	
‘flip	 a	 coin’	 at	 the	 beginning.	 The	 proportion,	 however,	 increases	 considerably	 when	
subjects	are	allowed	to	vote	repeatedly;	often	to	more	than	80	percent.	A	higher	number	
of	 voting	 rounds,	 experience	 with	 both	 games	 before	 the	 voting,	 and	 more	 detailed	
information	about	other	groups	tend	to	speed	up	the	learning	process.	Learning	is	thus	
an	important	factor	that	can	explain	a	big	part	of	the	different	experimental	results.		
We	 can	 also	 identify	 two	 factors	 that	 hamper	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 institution,	 even	with	
repeated	voting.	The	first	important	factor	is	inequality.	When	the	cooperation	problem	
is	 global	 but	 the	 institution	 covers	 only	 a	 subset	 of	 players,	 subjects	 appear	 to	 be	
reluctant	to	join	the	institution	even	if	it	is	profitable	compared	to	the	situation	without	
institution.	 Institutions	 also	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 effective	 and	 less	 popular	 if	 they	 do	 not	
completely	 eliminate	 free‐riding	 incentives,	 i.e.	 they	 allow	 players	 to	 benefit	 from	
others’	cooperation	efforts	without	facing	a	risk	of	getting	punished.	An	example	for	this	
is	 a	 formal	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 scheme.	 Free‐riders	 earn	 less	 under	 this	
institution	than	without	the	institution	but,	when	they	play	with	a	cooperator,	they	still	
earn	more	than	the	cooperator.	The	second	important	factor	is	the	cost	of	the	institution.	
A	significant	share	of	subjects	opposes	the	institution	when	it	involves	a	fixed	cost,	even	
if	this	cost	is	often	offset	by	a	higher	cooperation	level	in	those	groups	that	choose	the	
institution.	
	
4.	Differences	between	supporters	and	opponents	of	the	institution	
In	 this	 section	we	describe	 if	 there	are	 certain	 individual	 characteristics	and	attitudes	
that	 influence	 participants’	 decision	 to	 vote	 for	 or	 against	 enacting	 the	 institution.	 A	
common	finding	is	that	subjects	with	a	strong	cooperative	inclination	vote	in	favor	of	the	
institution	(Dal	Bó	et	al.,	2010;	Ertan	et	al.,	2009;	Grimm	and	Mengel,	2009;	2011;	Sutter	
and	Weck‐Hannemann,	2003;	2004;	Kocher	et	al.,	2016;	Vollan	et	al.,	2017;	Gallier,	2017;	
Fehr	and	Williams,	2017).	Furthermore,	subjects	who	have	experienced	very	low	levels	
of	cooperation	in	the	past	are	more	likely	to	vote	in	favor	of	the	institution	(Bohnet	and	
Kübler,	 2005;	 Barrett	 and	 Dannenberg,	 2017;	 Dal	 Bó	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Dannenberg	 et	 al.,	
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2019).	 Subjects	 who	 have	 made	 bad	 experience	 with	 the	 institution,	 for	 instance,	 by	
receiving	punishment,	 sometimes	oppose	 the	 institution	 later	 (Ostrom	et	al.,	1992).	 In	
other	 cases,	 most	 notably	 when	 information	 about	 the	 performance	 in	 the	 different	
games	 is	 provided,	 formerly	 punished	 players	 change	 their	 behavior	 and	 come	 to	
support	the	institution	later	(Gürerk	et	al.,	2006).	
Several	studies	show	that	subjects’	beliefs	about	the	behavior	in	the	available	games	are	
very	important	for	their	institutional	choice.	Subjects	are	more	likely	to	vote	in	favor	of	
the	 institution	 if	 they	have	 optimistic	 beliefs	 about	 the	 behavior	 under	 the	 institution	
and/or	if	they	have	pessimistic	beliefs	about	behavior	in	the	original	cooperation	game	
(Barrett	and	Dannenberg,	2017;	Dal	Bó	et	al.,	2018;	Grimm	and	Mendel,	2009;	Kosfeld	et	
al.,	2009).	Martinsson	and	Persson	(2019)	find	that	subjects	who	contribute	more	than	
what	they	expect	from	others	are	more	likely	to	vote	in	favor	of	the	institution.		
Some	 studies	 test	 if	measures	of	people’s	 cognitive	and	 strategic	abilities	 such	as	 SAT	
scores,	 IQ	 tests,	 final	 high	 school	 grades,	 or	 decisions	 in	 a	 beauty	 contest	 game	 are	
correlated	 with	 the	 institutional	 choice.	 Dal	 Bó	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 for	 example,	 find	 that	
subjects	with	better	 SAT	 scores	 and	better	performance	 in	 a	beauty	 contest	game	are	
more	likely	to	vote	for	a	coordination	game	rather	than	a	prisoners’	dilemma.	Kamei	et	
al.	 (2015)	 find	 that	 subjects	with	 a	 high	 IQ	 test	 score	 are	more	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 the	
institution	 that	 gives	 higher	 payoffs.	 However,	 Dal	 Bó	 et	 al.	 (2018)	 and	 Barrett	 and	
Dannenberg	(2017)	find	no	effects	of	similar	measures	on	the	voting	decisions.	Sutter	et	
al.	 (2010)	test	 if	subjects’	social	orientation	can	predict	their	voting	decisions	but	they	
find	 no	 significant	 effect.	 Fehr	 and	 Williams	 (2017),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 find	 that	
prosocial	 subjects	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 join	 punishment	 institutions,	 especially	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	game	when	it	is	not	yet	common	knowledge	that	these	institutions	lead	
to	higher	payoffs.	
Gallier	 (2017)	 measures	 in	 how	 far	 participants	 believe	 that	 they	 have	 control	 over	
events	 that	affect	 their	personal	 lives	and	relates	 this	 internal	 locus	of	control	 to	 their	
institutional	choice.	He	 finds	that	participants	who	believe	 that	 they	have	control	over	
events	are	more	likely	to	vote	for	a	formal	non‐deterrent	punishment	scheme.	A	plausi‐
ble	explanation	is	that	these	people	are	more	likely	to	believe	that	they	can	change	the	
group	outcome	by	 changing	 the	 institution.	The	 study	also	 reports	 that	men	are	more	
likely	 to	 vote	 for	 the	 punishment	 institution	 and	 that	 participants	who	 report	 to	 take	
part	 in	 political	 activities,	 like	 protests,	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 the	 punishment	
scheme.	Martinsson	and	Persson	(2019)	find	that	women	are	more	likely	to	vote	in	favor	
of	a	group‐wide	minimum	contribution	level	than	men.	We	are	not	sure	what	to	make	of	
these	latter	results,	but	they	show	that	the	influence	of	gender	and	other	personal	char‐
acteristics	 on	 institutional	 choice	 surely	 is	 an	 important	 area	 for	 future	 research.	 For	
example,	 reviewing	 gender	 differences	 in	 experimental	 games,	 Croson	 and	 Gneezy	
(2009)	find	that	women	are	more	risk	averse	than	men	and	their	social	preferences	are	
more	sensitive	to	the	context;	a	finding	that	may	also	be	relevant	for	institutional	choice.	
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5.	Effects	of	endogenous	and	exogenous	institutional	choice	
5.1	Difference	between	endogenous	and	exogenous	institutions	
A	number	of	 studies	provide	a	 comparison	between	a	 treatment	 in	which	players	 can	
implement	the	institution	or	not	and	treatments	in	which	the	institution	is	exogenously	
imposed	or	not.	Based	on	these	studies,	three	different	comparisons	can	be	made:	(i)	a	
comparison	between	players	who	have	endogenously	 implemented	the	 institution	and	
players	who	act	under	the	same	but	exogenously	imposed	institution,	(ii)	a	comparison	
between	 players	 who	 have	 decided	 against	 the	 institution	 and	 players	 who	 were	
exogenously	 put	 into	 the	 game	 without	 the	 institution,	 and	 (iii)	 an	 aggregated	
comparison	 between	 players	 who	 decide	 endogenously	 in	 favor	 or	 against	 the	
institution	 and	 players	 who	 are	 forced	 to	 play	 under	 the	 institution.	 The	 latter	
comparison	 shows	 whether	 letting	 players	 choose	 has	 an	 overall	 positive	 effect	 on	
cooperation,	 given	 that	 some	 players	 implement	 the	 available	 institution	 and	 other	
players	do	not.	In	this	section,	we	will	look	at	all	three	comparisons	in	the	above	order.	
Afterwards	we	will	 describe	 the	 different	 effects	 that	 contribute	 to	 different	 behavior	
under	endogenously	chosen	institutions	and	exogenously	imposed	institutions.	
On	 the	 first	 comparison,	 a	 relatively	 robust	 finding	 is	 that	 an	 institution	 that	 is	
endogenously	 chosen	 by	 the	 players	 leads	 to	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 cooperation	 than	 an	
institution	that	is	exogenously	imposed	upon	players.12	The	difference	tends	to	be	small	
for	 institutions	 that	make	 full	 cooperation	 the	unique	equilibrium	of	 the	game,	 simply	
because	cooperation	in	these	cases	is	high	irrespective	of	how	the	institution	is	chosen.	
For	example,	in	the	two‐player	game	by	Dal	Bó	et	al.	(2018)	where	mutual	cooperation	
is	 the	 unique	 equilibrium,	 94	 to	 98	 percent	 of	 players	 cooperate	 when	 the	 game	 is	
chosen	by	 the	players	 and	92	 to	93	percent	 cooperate	when	 the	 game	 is	 exogenously	
imposed.	Similarly,	Tyran	and	Feld	(2006)	find	a	contribution	rate	of	96	percent	when	a	
formal	deterrent	punishment	institution	is	chosen	by	the	players	and	93	percent	when	it	
is	exogenously	imposed.	Andreoni	and	Gee	(2012)	report	an	average	contribution	of	95	
percent	when	a	formal	deterrent	punishment	institution	is	chosen	by	the	players	and	91	
percent	when	the	same	institution	is	exogenously	imposed.	The	minimum	contribution	
levels	 studied	 by	 Kocher	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 and	 Martinsson	 and	 Persson	 (2019)	 are	 also	
relatively	strong	institutions	that	change	the	equilibrium	from	zero	contributions	to	the	
minimum	 level.	 Similar	 to	 the	 studies	 above,	 they	 find	 only	 very	 small	 differences	
between	the	endogenous	case	and	the	exogenous	case.	Kocher	et	al.	(2016)	actually	find	
a	lower	cooperation	rate	in	the	endogenous	case	which	may	also	be	explained	by	their	
subject	pool	(Chinese	students)	and	the	use	of	the	strategy	method.	
Larger	differences	arise	when	the	institution	makes	cooperation	one	equilibrium	among	
others	 or	 when	 the	 institution	 does	 not	 change	 the	 equilibrium	 at	 all.	 These	 weaker	
institutions	are	not	always	effective	and	they	tend	to	be	more	effective	for	players	and	
groups	 that	 have	decided	 to	 implement	 them.	Dal	Bó	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 let	 subjects	 choose	
                                                            
12	Similar	observations	have	been	made	in	the	field.	Pommerehne	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(1996)	and	Frey	
(1998),	for	example,	show	that	income	tax	compliance	in	Switzerland	increases	with	democratic	participa‐
tion.	Bardhan	(2000)	shows	that	users	of	a	common‐pool	resource	manage	the	resource	more	successfully	
when	they	are	genuinely	engaged	in	the	decisions	on	the	terms	of	use.	
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between	a	prisoners’	dilemma	and	a	coordination	game	with	multiple	equilibria.	They	
find	 a	 cooperation	 rate	 of	 72	 percent	 when	 the	 coordination	 game	 is	 chosen	 by	 the	
players	 and	 50	 percent	 when	 the	 coordination	 game	 is	 exogenously	 imposed.	 In	 the	
public	 goods	 game	 with	 an	 informal	 punishment	 option	 by	 Gürerk	 et	 al.	 (2014),	 the	
contribution	rate	is	91	percent	when	the	players	have	joined	the	game	voluntarily	and	it	
is	only	54	percent	when	the	game	has	been	imposed	upon	the	players.	In	Feld	and	Tyran	
(2002),	 the	 contribution	 rate	 is	 71	 percent	when	 a	 formal	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	
institution	 is	 chosen	 by	 the	 players	 and	 38	 percent	 when	 it	 is	 exogenously	 imposed.	
Similar	 results	 are	 provided	 by	 Bohnet	 and	 Kübler	 (2005),	 Tyran	 and	 Feld	 (2006),	
Grimm	 and	Mengel	 (2009),	 Sutter	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 Kamai	 et	 al.	 (2015),	Markussen	 et	 al.	
(2014),	and	Fehr	and	Williams	(2017).		
However,	there	are	also	some	studies	that	consider	relatively	weak	institutions	and	still	
do	not	find	a	clear	difference	between	the	endogenous	and	the	exogenous	case.	Vollan	et	
al.	(2017)	let	samples	of	students	and	workers	in	China	play	a	public	goods	game	with	or	
without	a	formal	non‐deterrent	punishment	scheme.	They	find	no	difference	between	an	
endogenously	 implemented	punishment	scheme	(59	percent	contribution	rate)	and	an	
exogenously	imposed	punishment	scheme	(60	percent).	The	authors	explain	this	finding	
with	 the	 importance	 and	 long	 history	 of	 authoritarian	 norms	 in	 China.	 Gallier	 (2017)	
and	 Dannenberg	 et	 al.	 (2019)	 also	 report	 only	 small	 and	 insignificant	 differences	 in	
cooperation	 between	 endogenously	 and	 exogenously	 implemented	 institutions,	 even	
though	their	experiments	were	conducted	with	German	students.	A	possible	explanation	
for	this	result	 in	Gallier	(2017)	may	be	that	the	subjects	play	ten	rounds	of	a	standard	
public	 goods	 game	before	 they	 vote	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 formal	 non‐deterrent	
punishment	 institution.	 During	 these	 rounds,	 players	 already	 accumulate	 information	
about	the	cooperativeness	of	the	group	which	perhaps	limits	the	value	of	the	signal	that	
is	associated	with	voting	in	favor	of	the	institution.	Dannenberg	et	al.	(2019)	study	the	
effect	of	an	exclusion	institution	which	can	be	used	to	exclude	players	from	the	group.	
While	 this	 institution	 does	 not	 change	 the	 zero	 contributions	 equilibrium,	
psychologically	it	may	be	perceived	as	a	strong	institution	that	is	similarly	effective	on	
groups	that	have	chosen	it	and	groups	that	are	assigned	to	it.	
In	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2003)	players	can	choose	whether	or	not	to	implement	
asymmetric	minimum	contribution	 levels	 in	 a	non‐linear	public	 goods	 game.	The	pre‐
specified	minimum	contribution	levels	are	below	the	Nash	equilibrium	and	do	not	affect	
the	 free‐riding	 incentives	 in	 the	 game.	 There	 is	 only	 a	 small	 difference	 in	 average	
cooperation	 rates	 between	 endogenously	 (8	 percent)	 and	 exogenously	 (12	 percent)	
implemented	minimum	contribution	levels.	One	special	feature	of	this	experiment	is	that	
the	 institution	 assigns	 asymmetric	 minimum	 contribution	 levels	 to	 the	 players.	 The	
players	 with	 relatively	 high	 minimum	 levels	 make	 lower	 contributions	 when	 the	
obligations	were	 determined	 endogenously	 by	 the	 group	 (0	 percent)	 than	when	 they	
were	 determined	 exogenously	 (24	 percent).	 For	 the	 players	 with	 relatively	 low	
minimum	 levels,	 cooperation	 is	 slightly	 higher	 in	 the	 endogenous	 case	 than	 the	
exogenous	case	 (10	percent	versus	5	percent).	 In	a	 follow‐up	study,	Sutter	and	Weck‐
Hannemann	(2004)	investigate	symmetric	minimum	contribution	levels.	They	find	only	
a	 small	 difference	 in	 cooperation	 rates	 between	 endogenously	 (8	 percent)	 and	
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exogenously	(6	percent)	 implemented	minimum	contribution	levels	that	are	below	the	
Nash	equilibrium..	
The	second	comparison	concerns	the	players	who	decide	against	the	institution	and	the	
players	 who	 are	 exogenously	 assigned	 into	 the	 same	 situation.	 In	 these	 cases,	
cooperation	often	is	lower	when	the	decision	is	made	endogenously	by	the	players	than	
when	 it	 is	 made	 exogenously,	 though	 the	 differences	 are	 not	 large.	 Feld	 and	 Tyran	
(2002)	find	an	average	contribution	rate	of	24	percent	when	players	reject	a	formal	non‐
deterrent	punishment	scheme	and	a	contribution	rate	of	30	percent	when	players	do	not	
have	a	choice	to	implement	the	punishment	institution.	In	the	follow‐up	study	by	Tyran	
and	 Feld	 (2006),	 the	 average	 contribution	 rate	 is	 15	 percent	 when	 players	 reject	 a	
formal	deterrent	punishment	scheme	(22	percent	in	case	of	a	non‐deterrent	punishment	
scheme)	and	the	contribution	rate	is	30	percent	when	the	players	have	no	choice.	Vollan	
et	 al.	 (2017)	 who	 consider	 a	 formal	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 scheme	 report	 an	
average	 contribution	rate	of	38	percent	when	groups	 fail	 to	 implement	 the	 institution	
and	a	contribution	rate	of	47	percent	when	the	game	 is	exogenously	assigned.	Similar	
results	are	reported	by	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2004),	Sutter	et	al.	(2010),	Kocher	
et	 al.	 (2016),	 and	 Gallier	 (2017).	 Four	 studies	 provide	 comparisons	 where	 the	
differences	between	the	endogenous	case	and	the	exogenous	case	are	positive	but	small	
(Grimm	and	Mengel,	2009;	Dal	Bó	et	al.,	2010;	Sutter	et	al.,	2010;	and	Dannenberg	et	al.,	
2019).	
The	third	comparison	concerns	the	question	whether	it	is	beneficial	in	the	aggregate	to	
let	 players	 choose	 the	 institution	 endogenously	 compared	 to	 an	exogenously	 imposed	
institution.	 This	 question	 is	 highly	 relevant	 for	 policy	 whenever	 a	 regulator	 has	 the	
power	to	enforce	regulations	but	may	want	to	leave	the	decision	to	the	constituency,	to	
be	taken	for	example	in	a	referendum,	if	this	promises	a	better	outcome	in	the	end.	If	all	
players	chose	the	institution,	then	letting	them	choose	would	be	better	than	forcing	the	
institution	 upon	 them.	 However,	 given	 that	 some	 players	 decide	 against	 enacting	 the	
institution	and	then	often	fare	poorly,	the	answer	is	a	priori	not	obvious.	Tyran	and	Feld	
(2006)	find	that	cooperation	rates	are	higher	when	players	can	decide	whether	or	not	to	
impose	 a	 formal	 non‐deterrent	 punishment	 scheme	 (47	 percent)	 than	 when	 the	
institution	 is	 exogenously	 imposed	 (33	 percent).	 Similar	 results	 for	 a	 non‐deterrent	
contributions	rule	are	provided	by	Feld	and	Tyran	(2002).	All	other	studies	find	either	a	
small	positive	effect	or	a	negative	effect.	The	experiments	by	Sutter	et	al.	(2010),	Kocher	
et	 al.	 (2016),	 Vollan	 et	 al.	 (2017),	 and	 Martinsson	 and	 Persson	 (2019)	 find	 a	 small	
positive	effect.13	The	studies	by	Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	(2003,	2004),	Tyran	and	
Feld	(2006),	Grimm	and	Mengel	(2009),	Sutter	et	al.	(2010),	Andreoni	and	Gee	(2012),	
Gallier	(2017),	and	Dannenberg	et	al.	(2019)	find	a	negative	effect.		
Table	2	provides	an	overview	of	the	three	comparisons.	Note	that	the	table	distinguishes	
not	only	between	studies	but	also	experimental	treatments	when	there	are	several	that	
                                                            
13	For	studies	relying	on	the	strategy	method	it	is	not	always	clear	how	many	groups	end	up	with	the	insti‐
tution	and	how	many	without	(Feld	and	Tyran	2002,	Kocher	et	al.	2006,	and	Vollan	et	al.	2017).	In	these	
cases,	we	use	 the	 individual	 voting	decisions	as	an	approximation	 for	how	many	groups	 take	decisions	
inside	and	outside	the	institution.		
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are	relevant	for	the	comparisons.	Note	also	that	we	refer	to	the	size	of	the	effects.	The	
effect	size	often	corresponds	with	statistical	significance	but	not	always.	In	some	cases,	
we	do	not	know	if	the	difference	is	significant	or	not.	In	summary,	the	comparisons	show	
that	cooperation	tends	to	be	higher	when	the	institution	is	endogenously	chosen	by	the	
players	than	when	it	 is	exogenously	 imposed,	cooperation	tends	to	be	 lower	when	the	
institution	 is	 rejected	 by	 the	 players	 than	when	 it	 is	 exogenously	 left	 out,	 and	 letting	
players	choose	is	not	necessarily	better	than	forcing	the	institution	upon	them.		
	
Table	2.	Differences	between	endogenous	and	exogenous	institutions	
Comparison	1.	Players	who	have	endogenously	implemented	the	institution	and	players	who	act	under	the	same	but	
exogenously	imposed	institution	
Higher	cooperation	in	the	
endogenous	case	
Only	slightly	higher	cooperation	in	
the	endogenous	case	or	no	difference	
Lower	cooperation	in	the	
endogenous	case	
12	treatments	
	
 Feld	and	Tyran	2002		
 Bohnet	and	Kübler	2005		
 Tyran	and	Feld	2006	(Mild	law)	
 Grimm	and	Mengel	2009	(T0)		
 Dal	Bó	et	al.	2010		
 Sutter	et	al.	2010	(|L|=1	and	|L|=3)	
 Gürerk	et	al.	2014	
 Markussen	 et	 al.	 2014	 (IS	 and	 non‐
deterrent	FS)	
 Kamei	et	al.	2015	(IS)	
 Fehr	and	Williams	2017		
13	treatments
	
 Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	2003	
 Sutter	 and	 Weck‐Hannemann	 2004	
(endo2‐tax)	
 Tyran	and	Feld	2006	(Severe	law)	
 Andreoni	and	Gee	2012	
 Vollan	et	al.	2017	
 Gallier	2017	
 Dal	Bó	et	al.	2018	(all	4	treatments)	
 Dannenberg	et	al.	2019	(B10	and	B8)	
 Martinsson	and	Persson	2019	
1	treatment	
	
 Kocher	et	al.	(2016)	
	 	
Comparison	2.	Players	who	have	decided	against	the	institution	and	players	who	are	exogenously	put	into	the	game	
without	the	institution	
Higher	 cooperation	 in	 the	
endogenous	case	
Only	 slightly	 higher	 cooperation	 in	
the	endogenous	case	or	no	difference	
Lower	 cooperation	 in	 the	
endogenous	case	
	 5	treatments
	
 Grimm	and	Mengel	2009	(T0)	
 Dal	Bó	et	al.	2010	
 Sutter	et	al.	2010	(|L|=3)	
 Dannenberg	et	al.	2019	(B10	and	B8)	
8	treatments	
	
 Feld	and	Tyran	2002		
 Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	2004	
(endo2‐tax)	
 Tyran	and	Feld	2006	(Mild	law	and	
Severe	law)		
 Sutter	et	al.	2010	(|L|=1)	
 Kocher	et	al.	2016	
 Vollan	et	al.	2017	
 Gallier	2017	
	 	
Comparison	3.	Aggregated	comparison	between	players	who	decide	endogenously	and	players	who	act	under	 the	
exogenously	imposed	institution	
Higher	 cooperation	 in	 the	
endogenous	case	
Only	 slightly	 higher	 cooperation	 in	
the	endogenous	case	or	no	difference	
Lower	 cooperation	 in	 the	
endogenous	case	
2	treatments	
	
 Feld	and	Tyran	2002	
 Tyran	and	Feld	2006	(Mild	law)	
6	treatments
	
 Sutter	et	al.	2010	(|L|=1	reward	and	
|L|=3	punishment	and	|L|=3	reward)	
 Kocher	et	al.	2016	
 Vollan	et	al.	2017	
 Martinsson	and	Persson	2019	
9 treatments	
	
 Sutter	and	Weck‐Hannemann	2003	
 Sutter	 and	 Weck‐Hannemann	 2004	
(endo2‐tax)	
 Tyran	and	Feld	2006	(Severe	law)	
 Grimm	and	Mengel	2009	(T0)	
 Sutter	et	al.	2010	(|L|=1	punishment)	
 Andreoni	and	Gee	2012	
 Gallier	2017	
 Dannenberg	et	al.	2019	(B10	and	B8)	
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5.2	Separating	between	different	effects	of	institutional	choice	
The	 results	 so	 far	 imply	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 players	 who	 play	 under	 the	
institution	and	the	players	who	do	not	play	under	the	institution	is	larger	when	players	
have	 made	 the	 institutional	 decision	 themselves	 than	 when	 the	 decision	 was	 made	
exogenously.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that,	 when	 players	 are	 assigned	 exogenously,	 the	
difference	 in	behavior	 is	driven	by	only	one	effect,	namely	the	effect	of	 the	 institution.	
When	 players	 are	 allowed	 to	 choose,	 three	 additional	 effects	 are	 at	 play:	 a	 selection	
effect,	an	information	effect,	and	a	democracy	effect.	In	principle,	we	would	expect	that	
all	three	of	the	additional	effects	reinforce	the	institution	effect	on	cooperation,	i.e.	they	
affect	cooperation	positively	 for	 the	players	who	decide	 in	 favor	of	 the	 institution	and	
they	affect	cooperation	negatively	for	the	players	who	decide	against	the	institution.	We	
would	also	expect	that	the	relative	magnitude	of	these	effects	depend	on	the	theoretical	
strength	 of	 the	 institution.	 The	 institution	 effect	 should	 be	 relatively	 large	 for	 strong	
institutions	that	make	cooperation	the	unique	equilibrium	of	the	game,	while	the	effects	
of	selection,	 information,	and	democracy	should	become	relatively	more	 important	 for	
weaker	institutions.	
In	 the	 literature,	 different	 approaches	have	been	proposed	 to	 isolate	 and	quantify	 the	
different	 effects.	 Dal	 Bó	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 quantify	 the	 different	 effects	 of	 choosing	 an	
institution	endogenously	with	a	randomization	technique	which	implements	the	group’s	
voting	 outcome	 only	 with	 some	 probability.	 Using	 a	 formal	 institution	 that	 makes	
mutual	 cooperation	 another	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 game,	 they	 report	 that	 the	 institution	
effect	 accounts	 for	 66	 percent	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 cooperation	 between	 players	 who	
decide	 to	 implement	 the	 institution	 and	 those	who	decide	 against	 the	 institution.	 The	
selection	 effect	 explains	 8	 percent	 of	 the	 difference	 while	 the	 information	 effect	 is	
negligible.	 Consequently,	 26	 percent	 of	 the	 difference	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 democracy	
effect.	Using	the	same	randomization	technique	for	a	non‐deterrent	formal	punishment	
scheme,	Gallier	(2017)	finds	that	only	32	percent	of	the	difference	in	contribution	rates	
between	 an	 endogenously	 chosen	 and	 rejected	 institution	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
institution	 effect.	 The	 information	 effect	 explains	 45	 percent	 of	 the	 difference,	 21	
percent	of	 the	difference	can	be	attributed	to	the	selection	effect,	and	5	percent	 to	 the	
democracy	effect.	The	experiment	by	Vollan	et	al.	(2017)	relies	on	the	strategy	method,	
in	which	players	make	contingent	cooperation	decisions	for	all	possible	distributions	of	
votes,	in	order	to	avoid	the	selection	effect	and	control	for	the	information	effect.	They	
find	that	 the	 information	effect	 is	negligible	 in	magnitude.	The	results	suggest	that	 the	
difference	in	cooperation	between	the	groups	that	implement	the	non‐deterrent	formal	
punishment	institution	and	the	groups	that	decide	against	it	is	mainly	explained	by	the	
institution	 effect	 (about	 60	 percent)	 and	 the	 democracy	 effect	 (about	 40	 percent).	
Notably,	 the	 democracy	 effect	 is	 not	 driven	 by	 high	 contributions	 of	 the	 groups	 that	
implement	the	punishment	institution	but	rather	by	low	contributions	of	the	groups	that	
fail	 to	 implement	 the	punishment	 institution.	 	The	 institution	effect	 is	 relatively	 large,	
given	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 institution,	 which	 may	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 subject	 pool	
(Chinese	 students	 and	workers).	Kocher	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 also	use	 the	 strategy	method	 to	
avoid	the	selection	effect.	Since	players	vote	on	whether	or	not	to	implement	the	binding	
minimum	contribution	 level	 and	 then	 the	decision	 of	 one	 randomly	 selected	player	 is	
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implemented	without	revealing	the	others’	voting	decisions,	the	information	effect	also	
is	virtually	removed.	Consequently,	 the	difference	 in	contributions	when	the	minimum	
contribution	level	is	endogenously	chosen	or	rejected	(51	percent	versus	31	percent	in	
the	high	level	treatment)	can	be	explained	by	the	institution	effect	(65	percent)	and	the	
democracy	effect	(35	percent).	Thus	we	observe	again	a	relatively	large	institution	effect	
for	a	strong	institution.		
Taken	 together,	 the	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 institution	 effect	 is	 the	most	 important	
factor	while	the	other	three	effects	tend	to	be	less	important.	Furthermore,	the	findings	
suggest	that	the	relative	magnitude	of	the	effects	depends	on	the	theoretical	strength	of	
the	 institution	 and	 the	 subject	 pool.	 As	 expected,	 the	 institution	 effect	 tends	 to	 be	
relatively	large	in	case	of	strong	institutions.	However,	the	number	of	studies	is	still	too	
small	and	the	employed	methods	are	too	diverse	to	allow	for	a	conclusive	assessment.	
Clearly,	more	research	is	needed	in	this	area	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	effects	in	
different	contexts	and	cultures.	
	
6.	Discussion	and	conclusions	
Do	people	make	wise	 decisions	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 institutions	 to	 solve	 a	
cooperation	problem?	This	question	 is	difficult	 to	 answer	because	we	only	know	how	
subjects	behave	after	having	chosen	a	certain	institution	and	we	do	not	know	how	they	
would	 have	 behaved	 if	 they	 had	 chosen	 differently.	 After	 all,	 if	 voters	 are	 pessimistic	
about	 the	 institution	 succeeding,	 failure	 of	 the	 institution	 will	 be	 a	 self‐fulfilling	
prophecy.	Nevertheless,	we	can	compare	the	performance	of	individuals	and	groups	that	
make	different	institutional	choices	and	investigate	if	the	institution	that	pays	off	more	
handsomely	 is	 spreading	 over	 time.	 An	 important	 and	 robust	 finding	 is	 that	 the	
individuals	 and	 groups	 who	 adopt	 the	 institution	 behave	 significantly	 more	
cooperatively	 than	 those	who	do	not	 adopt	 the	 institution.	This	 is	 true	 irrespective	of	
whether	the	institution	changes	the	theoretical	properties	of	the	game	or	not.	However,	
the	institutions	are	not	always	implemented.	When	subjects	choose	between	the	games	
for	 the	 first	 time,	 their	 voting	 decisions	 appear	 naïve	 and	 almost	 look	 like	 random	
decisions.	When	subjects	are	allowed	to	vote	repeatedly,	they	learn	and	the	proportion	
of	 individuals	 or	 groups	 that	 adopt	 the	 institution	 increases	 considerably.	 Learning	 is	
easier,	of	course,	the	more	information	is	available.	For	instance,	providing	information	
about	 the	 performance	 of	 groups	 playing	 in	 different	 games	 accelerates	 learning.	
Similarly,	 forcing	 groups	 to	 play	 all	 available	 games	 before	 they	 choose	 also	 helps	 to	
accelerate	learning	and	improve	choices.	However,	there	are	two	factors	which	hamper	
the	institutional	choice,	even	when	repeated	voting	is	possible.	First,	a	significant	share	
of	subjects	is	reluctant	to	support	the	institution	when	it	involves	a	fixed	cost	so	that	the	
overall	 first	best	outcome	is	no	 longer	feasible.	Second,	subjects	are	reluctant	to	adopt	
an	 institution	 that	 does	 not	 eliminate	 free‐riding	 incentives	 and	 allows	 for	 inequality	
among	players.	
Our	 review	 shows,	 furthermore,	 that	 there	 are	 systematic	 differences	 between	
supporters	 and	 opponents	 of	 the	 institution.	 Subjects	 with	 a	 strong	 cooperative	
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inclination	 often	 support	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 institution	 more	 than	 less	
cooperative	 subjects.	 Optimistic	 beliefs	 about	 cooperation	 under	 the	 institution	 and	
pessimistic	beliefs	about	cooperation	in	the	original	cooperation	game	also	makes	voting	
for	 the	 institution	 more	 likely.	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 subjects’	 cognitive	 and	
strategic	 abilities	 as	 well	 as	 their	 internal	 locus	 of	 control	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	
supporting	the	institution.	Gender	may	play	a	role,	too.	But	the	number	of	studies	is	still	
too	low	to	make	conclusive	assessments	and	more	research	is	needed	to	confirm	these	
relationships.	
Because	 of	 the	 importance	 and	 wide‐spread	 interest	 in	 democratically	 chosen	
institutions,	we	have	devoted	one	section	to	the	question	if	and	why	individuals	behave	
differently	 when	 they	 choose	 a	 game	 themselves	 than	 when	 the	 game	 is	 assigned	
exogenously.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 cooperation	 is	 higher	 when	 the	 institution	 is	
endogenously	 chosen	 than	 when	 it	 is	 exogenously	 imposed.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
cooperation	often	is	lower	when	the	institution	is	endogenously	rejected	than	when	it	is	
exogenously	left	out.	For	this	reason,	letting	people	choose	is	not	necessarily	better	than	
enforcing	 the	 institution	 from	 outside.	 Letting	 people	 choose	 therefore	 is	 only	
recommended	when	 there	 is	 a	 high	 chance	 that	most	 of	 them	will	 actually	 choose	 to	
implement	 the	 institution	 which	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 know	 in	 advance.	 Of	 course,	 for	
certain	problems,	 like	global	security	or	climate	change,	enforcement	of	the	institution	
from	 outside	 is	 not	 possible	 and	 players	 will	 have	 to	 choose	 the	 institution	
endogenously.	
Much	 of	 the	 experimental	 literature	 on	 the	 endogenous	 choice	 of	 institutions	 has	
developed	 only	 recently.	 These	 experiments	 are	 of	 great	 help	 to	 improve	 our	
understanding	of	the	effect	of	self‐selected	institutions	on	behavior	and	people’s	ability	
to	 choose	 institutions.	 The	 standard	 economic	 model	 based	 on	 perfectly	 rational,	
knowledgeable,	and	selfish	actors	often	is	silent,	ambiguous,	or	wrong	about	how	people	
choose.	Models	 that	 include	 learning	 (e.g.	Andreoni	1988,	Burton‐Chellew	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Camerer	and	Ho	1999)	or	social	preferences	(e.g.	Rabin,	1993;	Fehr	and	Schmidt,	1999)	
seem	to	be	more	suitable	to	predict	or	explain	behavior.	While	some	of	the	studies	use	
social	preference	models	to	explain	the	experimental	results	(Kosfeld	et	al.,	2009;	Sutter	
et	al.,	2010;	Markussen	et	al.,	2014;	Cobo‐Reyes	et	al.,	2019;	Dannenberg	et	al.,	2019)	we	
have	not	seen	the	utilization	of	learning	models	yet.	
Can	we	say	what	works	and	what	does	not	work?	We	can	be	confident	that,	in	a	setting	
where	 individuals	 choose	 repeatedly	 and	 where	 the	 institution	 eliminates	 the	 free‐
riding	incentives	for	all	players	and	is	not	too	expensive,	the	cooperation	problem	will	
be	 solved.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 three	 factors	 is	 not	met,	 we	 can	 expect	 difficulties.	 The	most	
difficult	problem	arises	when	the	institutional	choice	is	hard	to	reverse,	institutions	are	
costly	 and	 unable	 to	 eliminate	 all	 free‐riding	 incentives.	 In	 this	 case,	 a	 regulator	with	
enforcement	 power	 may	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 decide	 about	 and	 enforce	 the	
institution.	 Unfortunately,	 some	 of	 our	 most	 pressing	 problems,	 like	 global	 climate	
change,	are	of	this	kind	and	a	regulator	with	enforcement	power	does	not	exist.		
What	 is	missing	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 endogenous	 institutions?	Only	 one	 of	 the	 studies	
presented	 here	 allows	 players	 to	 communicate	 before	 they	 choose	 the	 institution	
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(Ostrom	 et	 al.,	 1992).	 There	 are	 only	 very	 few	 studies	 using	 asymmetric	 players	 or	
asymmetric	 institutions.	 Many	 dimensions	 of	 heterogeneity	 are	 conceivable	 and	 also	
relevant	 from	 a	 real‐world	 perspective,	 such	 as	 endowments,	 benefits	 or	 costs	 of	
cooperation,	 benefits	 or	 costs	 of	 the	 institution.	 More	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 better	
understand	 the	 effects	 of	 asymmetric	 information	 and	 incomplete	 monitoring	 or	
enforcement	on	 the	 choice	 and	effectiveness	of	 institutions.	Elinor	Ostrom	 (1990)	has	
argued	 that	 letting	people	choose	 their	own	 institutions	 is	better	 for	cooperation	 than	
enforcing	 institutions	 from	 outside	 because	 the	 outside	 regulator	 may	 not	 have	 the	
incentive	 or	 ability	 to	 establish	 and	 enforce	 effective	 institutions.	 This	 possibility	 is	
absent	 in	most	of	 the	surveyed	studies	 (exceptions	are	Nicklisch	et	al.,	2016	and	Fehr	
and	Williams,	2017)	and	deserves	more	attention.	Many	pressing	real	world	problems	
involve	 trade‐offs,	 so	 comparing	 second‐best	 institutions	 with	 one	 another	may	 offer	
valuable	 insights.	For	example,	 is	 it	better	 to	 implement	an	 institution	 that	comes	at	a	
high	fixed	cost	or	an	institution	that	is	less	costly	but	governs	only	a	subset	of	players?	In	
the	surveyed	experiments,	players	are	allowed	to	choose	between	different	rules	before	
they	play	the	game	whereby	the	available	rules	and	the	voting	mechanism	are	given.	In	
reality,	 these	 things	 are	 also	 often	 endogenous	 which	 may	 be	 the	 next	 step	 to	 study	
(Rockenbach	and	Wolff,	2016).	Finally,	to	test	the	robustness	of	the	reported	results,	it	
may	 be	 useful	 to	 conduct	 more	 experiments	 with	 non‐student	 samples	 with	 diverse	
cultural	 backgrounds,	 with	 larger	 groups,	 and	 with	 teams	 rather	 than	 individual	
decision	makers	(Charness	and	Sutter	2012).		
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Tables	S.1‐S.4	provide	detailed	information	about	all	studies	included	in	the	review.	The	numbers	provided	in	these	tables	may	differ	from	the	numbers	
provided	in	the	paper	because	we	provide	average	numbers	across	all	rounds	in	the	tables,	while	in	the	paper	we	pay	special	attention	to	the	outcomes	at	
the	beginning	and	at	the	end	of	the	game.	
	
Table	S.5	provides	detailed	information	about	the	studies	that	are	included	in	Figures	2‐5	in	the	main	paper,	including	the	treatments	and	from	where	we	
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Table	S.1	Local	public	goods	and	individual	choice	
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	variables Experience	before	choice	of	
institution	&	information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	
exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	a	formal	institution	(exogenously	enforced	modification	of	payoffs)
Bohnet		
and	
Kübler	
2005	
2	 5	rounds,	stranger,	
players	choose	
every	round	or	
once‐for‐all	
PD	vs.	modified	PD	with	
higher	payoff	to	
unilateral	cooperation	
(modification	does	not	
change	the	defection	
equilibrium)	
Players	bid	in	an	auction	to	
play	the	modified	PD.	Number	
of	players	that	can	play	the	
modified	PD	is	fixed.	
Random	assignments	
of	games	as	control.	
Number	of	players	who	
can	play	the	modified	
game.	Number	of	
auctions.	
No	prior	experience.	Subjects	
learn	about	their	own	payoff.	
No	information	about	groups	
from	the	other	institution.	
Yes,	higher	cooperation	in	
modified	PD	than	in	PD	
Fixed	by	design Cooperators	who	
meet	defectors	in	
the	PD.	Cooperators	
who	meet	
cooperators	in	the	
modified	PD.	
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	
endogenous	than	
exogenous	institution.	
Grimm	
and	
Mengel	
2009	
2	out	of	a	
population	
of	8	
4	+	96	rounds,	
stranger	(partner	
within	the	
population),	each	
player	chooses	
every	4	rounds	
PD	vs.	modified	PD	with	
lower	payoffs	to	
defection	(modification	
does	not	change	the	
defection	equilibrium)	
2	out	of	8	players	decide	each	
round	to	either	stay	in	their	
group	or	join	the	other	group.	
Exogenous	assignment	
to	games	as	control.	
Information	about	
average	payoffs	in	both	
groups.	(Not	
considered	here:	
imperfect	separation).	
4	rounds	with	random	
assignments	to	groups.	Prior	to	
playing,	subjects	are	informed	
about	the	percentage	of	
players	in	the	two	groups.	
After	playing,	subjects	learn	
about	the	co‐player’s	decision	
and	own	payoff.	
Yes	(62%	cooperation	in	
modified	PD	vs.	10%	in	
PD)	
59%	of	players	on	
average,	relatively	stable	
over	time	(67%	when	
information	about	average	
payoffs	in	both	groups	is	
provided)	
Conditional	
cooperators	who	
have	pessimistic	
beliefs	about	the	
PD.		
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	
endogenous	(62%)	than	
exogenous	institution	
(51%).	For	those	who	do	
not	implement	the	
institution:	no.	
Grimm	
and	
Mengel	
2011	
2	out	of	a	
population	
of	8	
4	+	96	rounds,
stranger	(partner	
within	the	
population),	each	
player	chooses	
every	4	rounds	
PD	vs.	punishment	of	
defection	
(modification	makes	
cooperation	the	
dominant	strategy)	
2	out	of	8	players	decide	each	
round	to	either	stay	in	their	
group	or	join	the	other	group	
(Not	considered	here:	
imperfect	separation).	
4	rounds	with	random	
assignments	to	groups.	Prior	to	
playing,	subjects	are	informed	
about	the	percentage	of	
players	in	the	two	groups.	
After	playing,	subjects	learn	
about	the	co‐player’s	decision	
and	own	payoff.	
Yes	(97%	cooperation	in	
modified	game	vs.	16%	in	
PD)	
50%	of	players	at	the	
beginning	(by	design),	
almost	all	in	the	second	
half	of	the	game	
Conditional	
cooperators	and	
norm	enforcers	
who	support	
punishment	of	
defection.	
n/a	
Cobo‐
Reyes	et	
al.	2019	
x	out	of	a	
population	
of	10	
30	rounds,	partner	
in	the	same	group,	
players	choose	the	
group	every	round	
PGG	vs.	punishment	of	
defection	(punishment	
institution	is	costly,	it	
makes	cooperation	the	
dominant	strategy)	
In	the	No‐Voting	treatment,	
players	decide	each	round	
whether	to	move	to	the	other	
group.	In	the	Voting	treatment,	
players	vote	every	5	rounds	on	
the	punishment	institution	and	
decide	each	round	whether	to	
move	to	other	group.	
Voting	and	No‐Voting	
on	the	punishment	
institution.	
No	prior	experience.	Subjects	
receive	information	about	
contributions	in	both	groups.	
Yes	(91%	vs.	41%	in	No‐
Voting,	93%	vs.	50%	in	
Voting)	
No‐Voting:	50%	of	players
at	the	beginning	(by	
design),	about	80%	at	the	
end.		
Voting:	Little	migration	
between	groups;	41	of	
players	vote	for	
punishment	in	the	
beginning,	62%	at	the	end.
n/a n/a	
Choosing	an	informal	institution	(punishment	or	reward	option)
Gürerk	
et	al.	
2006	
x	out	of	a	
population	
of	12	
30	rounds,	partner	
in	the	same	group,	
players	choose	
every	round	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
sanctioning	option	
(punishment	cost	1:3,	
reward	cost	1:1)	
(modification	does	not	
change	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium)	
Players	decide	each	round	to	
either	join	the	sanction‐free	
group	or	join	the	sanction	
group	
n/a No	prior	experience.	Subjects	
receive	detailed	information	
about	performance	in	both	
groups.	
Yes	(91%	cooperation	in	
PGG	with	sanctioning	
option	vs.	14%	in	PGG)	
	
37%	of	players	in	the	first	
round,	more	than	80%	in	
the	second	half	of	the	
game	
Initially high	
contributors	who	
punish	low	
contributors	
n/a	
Gürerk	
2013	
x	out	of	a	
population	
of	12	
30	rounds,	partner	
in	the	same	group,	
players	choose	
every	round	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	option	
(cost	1:3)	(modification	
does	not	change	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium)	
Players	decide	each	round	to	
either	join	the	PGG	or	the	PGG	
with	punishment	option	
Social	history	provided
or	not	
No	prior	experience.	Subjects	
receive	detailed	information	
about	performance	in	both	
groups.	In	social	history	
treatment,	players	receive	
information	about	main	results	
of	a	similar	previously	
conducted	experiment.	
Yes (With	social	history:
>85%	cooperation	in	
punishment	game	vs.	
<10%	in	PGG.	Without	
social	history:	>75%	
cooperation	in	punishment	
game	vs.	<10%	in	PGG).	
With	social	history:	54%
of	players	in	the	first	
round,	>90%	in	the	
second	half	of	the	game.	
Without	social	history:	
31%	in	the	first	round,	
>80%	in	the	second	half	of	
the	game.	
n/a n/a	
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Table	S.1	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	players	 Rounds,	matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions Decision	rule Treatment	
variables	
Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	institution	affect	
cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	
exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	an	informal	institution	(punishment	or	reward	option)
Gürerk	et	
al.	2014	
x	out	of	a	
population	of	
12	
30	rounds,	partner	in	the	
same	group,	players	
choose	every	round	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	option	(cost	
1:3)	and	PGG	vs.	PGG	
with	reward	option	(cost	
1:3)	(modification	does	
not	change	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium)	
Players	decide	each	
round	to	either	join	the	
PGG	or	the	PGG	with	
punishment/reward	
option	
Punishment option	
or	reward	option.	
Exogenous	
punishment	option	
with	allocation	of	
subjects	set	equal	
to	the	endogenous	
case	or	fixed.	
No	prior	experience.	
Subjects	receive	detailed	
information	about	
performance	in	both	
groups.	
Yes	(90%	cooperation	in	
punishment	game	vs.	11%	in	
PGG,	57%	cooperation	in	
reward	game	vs.	21%	in	
PGG).	
Punishment	option:	about	
30%	of	players	in	the	first	
round,	>	80%	in	the	
second	half	of	the	game.	
Reward	option:	≥	80%	
throughout.	
Punishment	option:	
initially,	subjects	
with	a	
predisposition	to	
cooperate	and	to	
punish.	
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	
endogenous	(73%)	than	
exogenous	institution	
(45%).	
Nicklisch	
et	al.	
2016	
x	out	of	a	
population	of	
10,	1	player	
plays	the	role	
of	the	
authority	
4+4+4+4+4+4+4+4	
rounds,	partner	in	the	
same	group,	players	
choose	at	the	beginning	
of	each	phase	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
decentralized	
punishment	(DP)	vs.	
PGG	with	central	
punishment	by	authority	
(CP)	
Players	decide	before	
each	phase	to	join	one	of	
the	three	games.	
Signal	about	others’	
contributions	is	
correct	with	100%,	
90%,	or	50%	
probability.	
No	prior	experience.	At	the	
beginning	of	each	phase	
subjects	are	informed	
about	performance	in	all	
three	groups.	
Yes	(In	100% treatment:	72‐
92%	cooperation	with	
punishment	vs.	29%	in	PGG.	
In	90%	treatment:	74‐83%	
cooperation	with	punishment	
vs.		24%	in	PGG.	In	50%	
treatment:	45‐49%	
cooperation	with	punishment	
vs.	20%	in	PGG)	
In	100%:	on	average	about	
45%	of	players	join	DP,	the	
rest	equally	CP	and	PGG.	In	
90%:	equally	DP,	CP,	and	
PGG.	In	50%:	almost	50%	
join	PGG,	the	rest	equally	
DP	and	CP.	
Punishment	of	
cooperators	
decreases	support	
for	that	punishment	
institution.	
n/a	
Fehr	and	
Williams	
2017	
x	out	of	a	
population	of	
9,	11,	or	12	
5+20	rounds,	partner	in	
the	same	group,	players	
choose	every	round	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
uncoordinated	
punishment	option	vs.	
PGG	with	coordinated	
punishment	option	vs.	
PGG	with	coordinated	
central	punishment	by	
authority	
Players	decide	each	
round	to	join	one	of	the	
four	games.	
Endogenous	and	
exogenous	choice	
of	institutions	
5	rounds	of	standard	PGG.	
Before	choosing	the	
institution,	players	are	
informed	about	
performance	in	each	game.	
After	each	round,	players	
are	informed	about	
individual	contributions	
and	own	payoffs.	
Yes	(90‐100%	cooperation	
with	coordinated	punishment	
option	and	central	
punishment	vs.	5‐20%	
cooperation	in	PGG)		
On	average,	7% of	players
join	the	PGG,	1%	the	game	
with	uncoordinated	
punishment	option,	40%	
the	game	with	coordinated	
punishment	option,	52%	
the	game	with	central	
punishment.	
Prosocial	subjects	
populate	the	games	
with	coordinated	
punishment	and	
central	punishment	
first.	
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	in	the	
first	12	rounds,	
cooperation	is	higher	in	
endogenous	punishment	
institutions	than	in	the	
same	exogenous	
institutions.	No	difference	
in	the	last	8	rounds.	
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Table	S.2	Local	public	goods	and	collective	choice	
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	variables Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	
institution	affect	
cooperation?	
How	many	
choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	institution? Differences	between	endogenous	and	
exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	a	formal institution	(exogenously	enforced	modification	of	payoffs)
Dal	Bó	
et	al.	
2010	
2	out	of	a	
population	
of	4	
10	+	10	rounds,
stranger	(partner	
within	the	
population),	
players	choose	
once‐for‐all	
PD	vs.	punishment	of	
unilateral	defection	
(modification	transforms	
the	PD	into	a	coordination	
game	where	mutual	
defection	and	mutual	
cooperation	are	Nash	
equilibria)	
Simple	
majority	
voting,	once‐
for‐all,	
computer	
breaks	ties	
Computer	randomly	
overrides	votes	or	not.
10	rounds	of	the	PD.	
Subjects	are	informed	about	
the	implemented	game	but	
not	the	distribution	of	votes.
Yes	(72%	
cooperation	in	
modified	game	vs.	
18%	in	PD	in	the	
first	round	after	
choosing)	
	
53% of	players	
vote	for	the	
modified	game.	
Subjects	with	high	SAT	scores	and	low	
numbers	in	BCG.	Cooperators	and	
those	who	faced	little	cooperation	in	
the	first	part.	
For	those	who	implement	the	institution:	
yes,	higher	cooperation	under	
endogenous	than	exogenous	institution	
(72%	vs.	50%	in	the	first	round	after	
choosing).	For	those	who	do	not	
implement	the	institution:	only	slightly	
higher	cooperation	in	endogenous	than	
exogenous	PD	(18%	vs.	15%	in	the	first	
round	after	choosing).		
Dal	Bó	
et	al.	
2018	
2	out	of	a	
population	
of	6	
5	+	5	rounds,
stranger,	players	
choose	once‐for‐
all	or	every	
round	
PD	vs.	punishment	of	
defection	that	also	reduces	
all	other	payoffs	
(modification	makes	
cooperation	the	dominant	
strategy)	
Random,	
random	
dictator,	
majority	
voting,	
repeated	
majority	
voting	
The	game	played	in	
the	first	5	rounds.	The	
decision	rule	used	to	
choose	the	game.	
Information	about	
past	subjects’	
behavior.	
5	rounds	of	the	PD	or	the	
modified	game.	Subjects	are	
informed	about	the	
implemented	game	but	not	
the	distribution	of	votes.	No	
information	about	groups	
from	the	other	game.	
Yes	(94‐98%	
cooperation	in	
modified	game	vs.	
15‐36%	in	PD)	
46% of	players in	
the	first	voting	
round,	72%	in	the	
final	round	with	
repeated	voting	
Subjects	who	have	more	realistic	
beliefs	about	behavior	in	the	two	
games.	Personal	characteristics,	
including	SAT	scores	and	chosen	
number	in	BCG,	do	not	predict	voting.	
Manipulating	the	belief	that	behavior	
differs	between	games	increases	
support	for	the	institution.	
For	those	who	implement	the	institution:	
only	slightly	higher	cooperation	under	
endogenous	(94‐98%)	than	exogenous	
institution	(92‐93%).	
For	those	who	do	not	implement	the	
institution:	small	differences	between	
endogenous	(21‐17%)	and	exogenous	
institution	(16‐30%).	
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Table	S.3	Global	public	goods	and	individual	choice	
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	
and	choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	variables Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	
between	
endogenous	and	
exogenous	
institution?	
Choosing	a	formal institution	(players	can	join	agreement	with	exogenously	enforced	restrictions	for	members)
Kosfeld	et	al.	
2009	
4	 20	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(members	are	bound	to	cooperate	
fully,	non‐members	are	not	
bound)	
Players	decide	
individually	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	Those	who	
join	decide	unanimously	
whether	or	not	to	
implement	the	
agreement.	
High	or	low	MPCR	to	the	
public	good	(not	
considered	here:	two	
treatments	without	
possibility	to	form	an	
agreement).	
No	prior	experience.	
Subjects	are	informed	about	
the	number	of	players	
willing	to	join	the	agreement	
and	whether	or	not	the	
agreement	is	implemented.	
Yes, by	design	
(members	are	bound	to	
cooperate	fully)	
With	low	MPCR,	institution	is	
implemented	in	43%	of	cases	and	
in	36%	participation	is	full.	With	
high	MPCR,	institution	is	
implemented	in	61%	of	cases	and	
in	42%	participation	is	full.	
Incomplete	agreements	are	often	
rejected	even	when	they	are	
profitable.	
Subjects	who	expect	that	
all	others	will	join,	too.	
n/a	
McEvoy	et	al.	
2011	
10	 13	rounds,	
stranger,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(members	are	bound	to	cooperate	
fully	and	punished	for	lower	
contributions	so	that	cooperation	
becomes	profitable,	non‐members	
are	bound	to	contribute	zero)	
Players	decide	
individually	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	Agreements	
form	if	minimum	
participation	threshold	
(MPT)	is	reached.	
Cost	of	enforcement.	Cost	
of	public	good	
production.	Minimum	
participation	threshold.	
No	prior	experience.	Real	
time	information	about	how	
many	other	subjects	join	the	
agreement.	
Yes, by	design	(non‐
members	are	bound	to	
contribute	zero).	
Compliance	in	the	
agreement	is	68%	if	
MPT=6	and	71%	if	
MPT=10.		
	
Institution	is	implemented	54‐96%	
of	cases	depending	on	MPT	(89%	if	
MPT=10).	
n/a n/a	
Dannenberg	
2012	
10	 10	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(different	rules	for	members,	non‐
members	are	not	bound	by	any	
rule)	
Players	decide	
individually	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	
Members	vote	on	a	
minimum	contribution	
level	and	treatments	
differ	in	which	proposal	
becomes	binding	for	
members.	
No	prior	experience.	Prior	to	
playing,	subjects	are	
informed	about	the	number	
of	members	and	non‐
members.	After	each	round,	
they	are	informed	about	
total	contributions	and	own	
payoff.		
Yes,	members	
contribute	more	than	
twice	as	much	as	non‐
members.	
About	50% of	players join	the	
agreement	when	the	smallest	
proposal	becomes	binding.	About	
one‐third	join	when	higher	
proposals	become	binding.	
n/a n/a	
Gerber	et	al.	
2013	
4	 10	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(members	are	bound	to	cooperate	
fully,	non‐members	are	not	
bound)	
Players	decide	
individually	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	Agreements	
form	if	MPT	is	reached.	
Minimum	participation	
threshold.	
No	prior	experience.	After	
each	round,	subjects	learn	
about	total	contributions	
and	their	own	payoff.	
Yes, by	design	
(members	are	bound	to	
cooperate	fully)	
Institution	is	implemented	57%	of	
the	time	if	MPT=4,	44%	if	MPT=3,	
53%	if	MPT=4	or	=3.	
Subjects	are	more	likely	
to	join	when	full	
participation	is	required.	
n/a	
Dannenberg	
et	al.	2014	
10	 10	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(different	rules	for	members,	non‐
members	are	not	bound	by	any	
rule)	
Players	decide	
individually	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	
Members	are	forced	to	
maximize	joint	payoffs	or	
they	can	vote	on	a	
minimum	contribution	
level	and	the	smallest	
proposal	becomes	
binding	for	members.	
No	prior	experience.	Prior	to	
playing,	subjects	are	
informed	about	the	number	
of	members	and	non‐
members.	After	each	round,	
they	are	informed	about	
total	contributions	and	own	
payoff.	
Yes,	members	
contribute	more	than	
twice	as	much	as	non‐
members.	
35%	of	players	join	the	agreement	
when	members’	joint	payoffs	are	
maximized.	53%	of	players	join	
when	members	can	vote	on	
minimum	contribution	level.	
Subjects	are	more	likely	
to	join	when	the	rule	for	
members	is	endogenous	
and	when	payoff	
differences	between	
members	and	non‐
members	are	not	too	
large.	
n/a	
McEvoy	et	al.	
2015	
6	 20	rounds,	
stranger,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	where	players	choose	
between	becoming	member	or	
non‐member	in	an	agreement	
(members	are	bound	to	cooperate	
fully,	non‐members	are	bound	to	
contribute	zero)	
Players	first	vote	on	the	
MPT	and	then	decide	
individually	and	
sequentially	whether	or	
not	to	join	the	
agreement.	Agreements	
form	if	MPT	is	reached.	
(Not	considered	here:	
capped	MPCR	so	that	
efficiency	requires	less‐
than‐full	agreement)	
No	prior	experience.	
Subjects	are	informed	about	
the	chosen	MPT	and	whether	
the	subjects	before	them	
have	joined	the	agreement	
or	not.	
Yes, by	design	
(members	are	bound	to	
cooperate	fully,	non‐
members	are	bound	to	
contribute	zero)	
56%	of	players	vote	for	full	and	
efficient	MPT	so	that	this	
requirement	is	implemented	in	
77%	of	cases.	In	those	cases,	
agreements	from	91%	of	the	time.	
Smaller	agreements	are	rarely	
implemented.	
n/a n/a	
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Table	S.4	Global	public	goods	and	collective	choice	
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	
variables	
Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	exogenous	
institution?	
Choosing	a	formal institution	(exogenously	enforced	restrictions	for	all	players)
Walker	et	al.	
2000	
7	 10	+	10	rounds,	
partner,	players	
choose	every	
round	
CPRG	with	binding	
extraction	level	for	each	
player	
All	players	make	
proposals	for	a	
binding	extraction	
level	for	each	player	
and	then	vote	on	the	
proposed	allocations,	
using	majority	or	
unanimity	voting.	
Standard	CPRG	if	no	
allocation	is	adopted.	
Standard	CPR	game	
without	voting,	
majority	voting	or	
unanimity	voting	on	
proposed	allocations.
10	rounds	of	standard	CPRG	
before	voting.	Before	
playing,	subjects	are	
informed	about	proposals,	
the	distribution	of	votes,	
and	the	binding	allocation.	
After	each	round,	they	are	
informed	about	total	
extraction	and	own	payoff.	
No	information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	efficiency	is	higher	
when	a	binding	
allocation	is	
implemented	than	
when	it	is	not	
implemented	
(unanimity	voting:	
100%	vs.	34%,	majority	
voting:	96%	vs.	53%).	
Under	unanimity	voting,	
60%	of	groups	
implement	binding	
allocations.	Under	
majority	voting,	55%	of	
groups	implement	
binding	allocations.		
n/a n/a
Sutter	and	
Weck‐
Hannemann	
2003	
3	 4+4+4+4+4	
rounds,	partner	
within	each	
phase,	stranger	
between	phases,	
players	choose	at	
the	beginning	of	
each	phase	
Non‐linear	PGG	vs.	non‐
linear	PGG	with	asymmetric	
binding	minimum	
contribution	levels	below	
the	Nash	equilibrium	level	
(NE),	players	randomly	
receive	a	high	or	low	
minimum	level	(the	
minimum	levels	do	not	
change	the	NE)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	on	pre‐
specified	asymmetric	
minimum	contribution	
levels	
Standard	PGG,	
exogenous	
asymmetric	
minimum	
contribution	levels,	
endogenous	
asymmetric	
minimum	
contribution	levels	
No	prior	experience.	
Subjects	are	informed	about	
whether	the	minimum	
contribution	levels	are	
implemented	or	not	and	
actual	contributions.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
No,	no	difference	in	
cooperation	rates	when	
minimum	contribution	
levels	are	implemented	
or	not	(8%	vs.	‐3%).	
On	average,	82%	of	
groups	implement	the	
minimum	contribution	
level.	No	difference	in	
voting	behavior	between	
advantaged	players	(low	
minimum	level)	and	
disadvantaged	players	
(high	minimum	level).	
High	contributors	are	more	
likely	to	vote	for	the	
implementation	of	the	
minimum	contribution	
level.	
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	on	average,	no	
difference	between	endogenous	
(8%)	and	exogenous	(12%)	
institution.	However,	for	
participants	with	high	obligations,	
lower	cooperation	rate	under	
endogenous	(0%)	than	exogenous	
institution	(24%).	For	those	who	
do	not	implement	the	institution:	
lower	cooperation	rate	in	
endogenous	(‐3%)	than	
exogenous	PGG	(6%).	
Sutter	and	
Weck‐
Hannemann	
2004	
3	 4+4+4+4+4	
rounds,	partner	
within	each	
phase,	stranger	
between	phases,	
players	choose	at	
the	beginning	of	
each	phase	
Non‐linear	PGG	vs.	non‐
linear	PGG	with	uniform	
binding	uniform	minimum	
contribution	level	below	or	
above	Nash	equilibrium	
(NE)	(the	low	minimum	
level	does	not	change	the	
NE,	the	high	minimum	level	
increases	the	equilibrium	
contributions	to	the	
minimum	level)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	on	pre‐
specified	uniform	
minimum	contribution	
levels	
Endogenous	
minimum	
contribution	level	is	
either	below	or	
above	NE	
No	prior experience.	
Subjects	are	informed	about	
whether	the	minimum	
contribution	levels	are	
implemented	or	not	and	
actual	contributions.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	cooperation	rates	
are	higher	when	
minimum	contribution	
levels	are	implemented	
than	when	they	are	not	
implemented	(above	
NE:	47%	vs.	‐7%,	below	
NE:	6%	vs.	‐16%).	
68%	of	groups	
implement	the	minimum	
contribution	level	when	it	
is	above	NE,	78%	when	it	
is	below	NE.	
	
If	the	minimum	
contribution	level	is	below	
NE,	high	contributors	are	
more	likely	to	vote	for	the	
implementation	of	the	
minimum	contribution	
level.	No	significant	
difference	if	the	minimum	
contribution	level	is	above	
NE.	
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	no	difference	between	
endogenous	(6%)	and	exogenous	
(8%)	institution.	For	those	who	
do	not	implement	the	institution:	
yes,	lower	cooperation	rate	in	
endogenous	(‐16%)	than	
exogenous	PGG	(6%).	
Margreiter	et	
al.	2005	
6	 10	+	10	rounds,	
partner,	players	
choose	every	
round	
CPRG	with	binding	
extraction	level	for	each	
player	
All	players	make	
proposals	for	a	
binding	extraction	
level	for	each	player	
and	then	vote	on	the	
proposed	allocations,	
using	majority	or	
unanimity	voting.	
Standard	CPRG	if	no	
allocation	is	adopted.	
Standard	CPRG	
without	voting,	
majority	voting	or	
unanimity	voting	on	
proposed	allocations.	
Homogeneous	or	
heterogeneous	
groups.	
10	rounds	of	standard	CPRG	
before	voting.	Before	
playing,	subjects	are	
informed	about	proposals,	
the	distribution	of	votes,	
and	the	binding	allocation.	
After	each	round,	they	are	
informed	about	total	
extraction	and	own	payoff.	
No	information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	efficiency	is	higher	
when	a	binding	
allocation	is	
implemented	than	
when	it	is	not	
implemented	
(homogeneous	groups:	
99%	vs.	66%,	
heterogeneous	groups:	
91%	vs.	67%).	
61%	of	all	homogeneous	
groups	implement	a	
binding	allocation.	32%	
of	all	heterogeneous	
groups	implement	a	
binding	allocation.	
	
n/a n/a
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Table	S.4	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	
and	choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	variables Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	exogenous	
institution?	
Choosing	a	formal	institution	(exogenously	enforced restrictions	for	all	players)
Kroll	et	al.	
2007	
5	 10	+	10	
rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	with	binding	uniform	
contribution	level	or	PGG	with	
non‐binding	uniform	
contribution	level	and	
punishment	option	(binding	
voting	makes	proposing	and	
voting	for	full	contribution	the	
weakly	dominant	strategy,	
non‐binding	voting	does	not	
change	the	zero‐contribution	
equilibrium).	
All	players	make	
proposals	for	a	binding	
(or	non‐binding)	
uniform	contribution	
level	and	then	vote	on	
the	proposals,	using	
majority	voting.	
Standard	PGG	is	played	
if	no	proposal	is	
adopted.	
Standard	PGG,	binding	
contribution	level,	non‐
binding	contribution	
level	with	punishment	
option	(not	considered	
here:	non‐binding	
contribution	level	
without	punishment	
option).	
10	rounds	of	standard	PGG	
before	voting.	Subjects	are	
informed	about	proposals,	
the	imposed	uniform	
contribution	level	and	
actual	contributions.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes	(by	design	in	case	of	
binding	contribution	
levels).		
	
With	binding	voting:	almost	
all	groups	(100%	in	the	final	
3	periods)	implement	the	
efficient	contribution	level.	
With	non‐binding	voting	
and	punishment	option:	
Almost	all	groups	(100%	in	
the	final	period)	implement	
the	efficient	level	and	almost	
all	players	comply.	
n/a n/a
Bernard	et	
al.	2013	
9		 10	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	each	
round	
CPRG	with	binding	uniform	
extraction	level	(binding	
voting	makes	proposing	and	
voting	for	socially	optimal	
extractions	the	weakly	
dominant	strategy)	
All	players	make	
proposals	for	a	uniform	
extraction	level	and	the	
median	proposal	
becomes	binding	for	all.	
Standard	CPRG	(not	
considered	here:	3	
randomly	selected	
leaders	determine	the	
uniform	extraction	
level)	
No	prior	experience.	
Subjects	are	informed	
about	the	proposals	and	
the	imposed	uniform	
extraction	level.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	by	design.	
Extractions	are	close	to	
the	social	optimum	
(98%).	
n/a n/a n/a
Dannenberg	
et	al.	2014	
10	 10	rounds,	
partner,	
players	
choose	every	
round	
PGG	with	binding	uniform	
minimum	contribution	level	
(proposing	full	contribution	is	
the	weakly	dominant	strategy)	
All	players	make	
proposals	for	a	uniform	
minimum	contribution	
level	and	the	smallest	
proposal	becomes	
binding	for	all.	
Standard	PGG No	prior	experience.	
Before	playing,	subjects	are	
informed	about	all	
minimum	proposals	and	
the	binding	level.	After	
each	round,	they	are	
informed	about	total	
contributions	and	own	
payoff.	No	information	
about	other	groups.	
Yes,	contributions	are	
very	close	to	the	chosen	
minimum	levels.		
40%	of	groups	choose	a	low	
minimum	level.	The	other	
60%	of	groups	have	an	
increasing	minimum	level	
over	time,	close	to	the	
optimum	at	the	end.	
n/a n/a
Kocher	et	al.	
2016	
4	 1	+	1	rounds,	
stranger,	
players	
choose	once	
PGG	with	binding	uniform	
minimum	contribution	level	
(voting	for	adoption	of	
minimum	level	is	dominant	
strategy)	
Players	vote	on	adoption	
of	pre‐specified	binding	
minimum	level	and	the	
decision	of	one	
randomly	selected	
player	is	implemented.	
Low	minimum	level	
(10%	of	endowment)	
and	high	minimum	
level	(35%)	
No	prior	experience. For	high	minimum	level,	
yes:	51%	cooperation	
with	minimum	level	vs.	
31%	without	minimum	
level.	For	low	minimum	
level,	no:	34%	
cooperation	with	
minimum	level	vs.	33%	
without	minimum	level).	
88%	of	players	vote	for	high	
minimum	level.	67%	vote	
for	low	minimum	level.	
High	contributors	are	
more	likely	to	vote	
for	adoption	of	
minimum	level.	
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	slightly	lower	
cooperation	under	endogenous	
than	exogenous	institution	(high	
minimum:	51%	vs.	55%,	low	
minimum:	34%	vs.	38%,).	For	
those	who	do	not	implement	the	
institution:	yes,	lower	cooperation	
in	endogenous	than	exogenous	
PGG	(high	minimum	31%	vs.	42%,	
low	minimum:	33%	vs.	38%).		
Martinsson	
and	Persson	
2019	
3	 1	+	1,	
stranger,	
players	
choose	once	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	binding	
uniform	minimum	
contribution	level	(voting	for	
adoption	of	minimum	level	is	
weakly	dominant	strategy)	
Majority	voting	on	
adoption	of	a	pre‐
specified	binding	
minimum	level	(25%	of	
endowment).	
Exogenous	and	
endogenous	adoption	
of	minimum	level.	
1	round	of	standard	PGG	
but	subjects	do	not	get	
feedback	until	the	end.	
Yes,	higher	cooperation	
with	minimum	level	than	
without	(47%	vs.	35%).	
81%	of	players	vote	in	favor	
of	the	minimum	level	which	
means	that	87%	of	groups	
implement	it.	
Women	and	subjects	
who	contribute	more	
than	they	expect	
others	to	contribute	
are	more	likely	to	
vote	for	the	adoption	
of	the	minimum	
contribution	level.		
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	no,	same	average	
cooperation	rate	under	
endogenous	and	exogenous	
institution	(47%).		
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Table	S.4	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	
variables	
Experience	before	choice	of	
institution	&	information	
Does	the	
institution	affect	
cooperation?	
How	many	choose	
the	institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	endogenous	
and	exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	a	formal	centralized	institution	(exogenously	enforced	modification	of	payoffs)
Andreoni	
and	Gee	
2012	
4	 10	+	10	rounds,	
stranger	
(rematching	
within	games),	
players	choose	
once‐for‐all	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	institution	
that	punishes	the	lowest	
contributor	
(modification	make	full	
contributions	the	unique	
Nash	equilibrium)	
In	a	pre‐play	stage,	all	
players	receive	an	
endowment	from	which	
they	can	contribute	to	a	
fund.	If	aggregate	
contributions	reach	a	
certain	threshold,	the	
punishment	institution	
is	implemented.	
n/a 10	rounds	of	PGG.	Before	playing,	
subjects	are	informed	about	the	
implemented	game.	
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	with	
punishment	than	
without	(95%	vs.	
14%)	
85%	of	groups	
implement	the	
punishment	
institution	
n/a For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	only	slightly	higher	
cooperation	under	endogenous	than	
exogenous	institution	(95%	vs.	91%).		
Barrett	and	
Dannenberg	
2017	
5	 5	+	5	+	5	+	5	
rounds,	partner,	
players	choose	at
the	beginning	of	
each	phase	
PD	vs.	modified	game	
(modification	transforms	
the	PD	into	a	
coordination	game	
where	all‐defect	and	all‐
cooperate	are	Nash	
equilibria)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	before	each	
phase	
Whether	or	not	the	
modified	game	
comes	at	a	collective	
cost.	Experience	in	
both	games	before	
voting.	
No	prior	experience	in	the	main	
treatments.	5	rounds	of	each	game	
in	one	treatment.	No	information	
about	other	groups.	
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	in	the	
modified	game	than	
in	the	PD	(without	
cost:	100%	vs.	21%,	
with	cost:	92%	vs.	
27%)	
57%	of	players	in	
the	first	round,	91%	
in	the	last	round	
when	modified	game	
is	free	of	cost.	11%	
in	the	first	round,	
51%	in	the	last	
round	when	it	is	
costly.	
Subjects	who	face	little	
cooperation	in	the	PD.	
Those	who	have	
optimistic	beliefs	about	
the	modified	game.	
Support	is	higher	when	
subjects	play	both	games	
before	voting.	High	
school	grades	and	BCG	
do	not	predict	voting.	
n/a
Choosing	a	formal	centralized	institution	(exogenously	enforced	modification	of	payoffs)
Feld	and	
Tyran	2002	
3	 1	round	 PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	of	not	
contributing	the	full	
amount	(modification	
does	not	change	the	
zero‐contribution	
equilibrium)	
Majority	voting Control	treatment	
with	exogenous	
implementation	of	
punishment.	
No	prior	experience.	In	the	
endogenous	condition,	subjects	
make	decisions	for	each	possible	
voting	outcome	(strategy	method).		
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	with	
punishment	than	
without	(71%	vs.	
24%)	
50%	of	players	vote	
for	punishment	
n/a For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	yes,	higher	cooperation	
under	endogenous	(71%)	than	
exogenous	institution	(38%).	For	
those	who	do	not	implement	the	
institution:	yes,	lower	cooperation	in	
endogenous	(24%)	than	exogenous	
PGG	(30%).	
Tyran	and	
Feld	2006	
3	 1+1	round,	
stranger	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	of	not	
contributing	the	full	
amount	(mild	
punishment	does	not	
change	the	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium,	severe	
punishment	makes	full	
contributions	the	
dominant	strategy)	
Majority	voting Mild	punishment	or	
severe	punishment.	
Control	treatments	
with	exogenous	
institutions.	
No	prior	experience.	In	the	
endogenous	conditions,	subjects	
make	decisions	for	each	possible	
voting	outcome	(strategy	method).	
Subjects	play	both	treatments	with	
mild	punishment	and	severe	
punishment.	In	the	exogenous	
condition,	subjects	play	all	three	
treatments:	exogenous	control	
(PGG),	exogenous	mild	and	severe	
punishment.	They	do	not	get	
feedback	until	the	end	of	the	
experiment.	
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	with	
punishment	than	
without	(mild	
punishment:	64%	
vs.	22%,	severe	
punishment:	96%	
vs.	15%)	
	
50%	of	players	vote	
for	mild	punishment.	
70%	vote	for	severe	
punishment.	
n/a For	those	who	implement	the	mild	
punishment	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	endogenous	(64%)	
than	exogenous	institution	(38%).	For	
those	who	implement	the	severe	
punishment	institution:	only	slightly	
higher	cooperation	under	endogenous	
(96%)	than	exogenous	institution	
(93%).	For	those	who	do	not	
implement	the	institution:	yes,	lower	
cooperation	in	the	endogenous	(15‐
22%)	than	exogenous	PGG	(30%).	
Vollan	et	al.	
2017	
3	 1	(+1)	rounds,	
stranger,	how	
often	players	
choose	differs	
between	
sessions	(one	or	
two	times).	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	of	not	
contributing	the	full	
amount	(modification	
does	not	change	the	
zero‐contribution	
equilibrium)	
Majority	voting Control	treatments	
with	exogenous	
institutions.	
Conducted	with	
students	and	
workers	from	China	
No	prior	experience.	Subjects	play	
all	treatments	but	do	not	get	
feedback	until	the	end	of	the	
experiment.	
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	when	
punishment	is	
implemented	than	
when	it	is	not	
implemented	(59%	
vs.	38%)		
42%	of	players	vote	
for	punishment	and	
58%	vote	against	
punishment.		
Cooperators	are	more	
likely	to	vote	for	
punishment.	
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	no	difference	between	
endogenous	(59%)	and	exogenous	
institution	(60%).	For	those	who	do	
not	implement	the	institution:	yes,	
lower	cooperation	in	endogenous	
(38%)	than	exogenous	PGG	(47%).	
 
9	
 
Table	S.4	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	
matching,	and	
choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	
variables	
Experience	before	choice	of	
institution	&	information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	institution? Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	endogenous	
and	exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	a	formal	centralized	institution	(exogenously	enforced	modification	of	payoffs)
Gallier	
2017	
3	 10	+	10	rounds,
partner,	players	
choose	once‐
for‐all	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	weak	
punishment	of	not	
contributing	the	full	
amount.	Punishment	
does	not	change	the	
zero‐contribution	
equilibrium.	
Simple	majority	
voting,	once‐for‐
all.	
Computer	
randomly	
overrides	votes	
10	rounds	PGG.	Subjects	are	
informed	about	the	implemented	
game	but	not	the	voting	
distribution.	
Yes,	higher	cooperation	
with	punishment	than	
without	(61%	vs.	14%)	
73%	of	players	vote	for	weak	
punishment.	
Cooperators	are	more	
likely	to	vote	for	
punishment.	Also	those	
with	a	high	locus	of	
control	are	more	likely	to	
vote	for	punishment.	
Females	and	participants	
with	a	high	political	
commitment	vote	less	
frequently	for	
punishment.		
For those	who	implement	the	
institution:	only	slightly	higher	
cooperation	under	endogenous	
(61%)	than	exogenous	institution	
(52%).	For	those	who	do	not	
implement	the	institution:	yes,	
lower	cooperation	in	endogenous	
(14%)	than	exogenous	PGG	(41%).		
Choosing	an	informal	institution	(punishment	or	reward	option)
Ostrom	
et	al.	
1992	
8	 10	+	x	+	x	
rounds,	partner,	
players	choose	
once‐for‐all	
CPRG	vs.	CPRG	with	
punishment	option	
(cost	1:2)	(modification	
does	not	change	the	
Nash	equilibrium)	
Strict	majority	
voting,	once‐for‐
all,	default	is	no	
punishment	
Experience	before	
the	voting	
10	rounds	of	the	CPR	game	plus	x	
rounds	of	the	CPR	game	with	
punishment.	Face‐to‐face	
communication	before	the	voting.	
Yes,	84%	average	yields	
when	punishment	is	
adopted	vs.	28%	when	
punishment	is	not	
adopted.		
56%	of	players	vote	for	punishment. Subjects	who	faced	a	lot	
of	punishment	before	
vote	against	it.	
n/a
Ertan	et	
al.	2009	
4	 3+3+8+8+8	or	
6+6+6+6+6	
rounds,	partner,	
players	choose	
at	the	beginning	
of	each	phase	
PGG	with	punishment	
option	(cost	1:4)	
allowing	punishment	of	
below‐average,	average	
and/or	above‐average	
contributors	
(modification	does	not	
change	the	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	on	who	can	
be	punished	
(below‐average,	
average,	above‐
average	
contributors)	
Number	of	voting	
rounds.	
Experience	before	
the	first	voting	
round.	
In	one	treatment,	subjects	play	
the	PGG	without	punishment	and	
unrestricted	punishment	(in	
rounds	1‐6)	prior	to	the	first	vote.	
No	prior	experience	in	the	other	
treatment.	Before	playing,	
subjects	are	informed	about	the	
punishment	rule,	if	any.	After	
playing,	subjects	receive	detailed	
information	about	all	groups	in	
the	same	session.	
Yes,	cooperation	and	
efficiency	are	higher	
when	punishment	of	
low‐but‐not‐high	
contributors	is	allowed	
than	when	punishment	
is	prohibited.	
21%	of	votes	support punishment	of	
below‐average	contributions	(11%	
against),	2%	support	punishment	of	
average	contributions	(30%	
against),	6%	support	punishment	of	
above‐average	contributions	(26%).	
No	group	allows	for	unrestricted	
punishment	or	punishment	of	high	
contributors.	Many	groups	move	
from	no	punishment	(50%,	65%)	to	
punishment	of	low‐but‐not‐high	
contributors	(85%,	90%).	
Cooperators	vote	for	
punishment	of	below‐
average	contributors	and	
against	punishment	of	
above‐average	
contributors	
n/a
Sutter	
et	al.	
2010	
4	 10	rounds,	
partner,	players	
choose	once‐
for‐all	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
binary	punishment	vs.	
PGG	with	binary	
reward	option	
(modification	does	not	
change	the	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium)	
Repeated	voting	
until	unanimity	is	
reached,	voting	is	
voluntary	and	
costly,	once‐for‐all
Cost	ratio	of	the	
punishment	and	
reward	options	
(low	leverage	1:1	
or	high	leverage	
1:3).	Control	
treatments	with	
exogenous	games.	
No	prior	experience.	Players are	
informed	about	the	number	of	
voters	and	the	outcome.	After	
each	round,	players	are	informed	
about	contributions	and,	if	
applicable,	punishment	or	reward	
decisions,	and	own	payoffs.	
Yes,	cooperation	is	
higher	with	punishment	
or	reward	option	than	
without	(with	low	
leverage:	81%	for	
punishment,	43%	for	
reward,	27%	for	PGG.	
With	high	leverage:	73%	
for	reward,	46%	for	
PGG).	
With	low	leverage: 13%	of	groups	
choose	the	punishment	option,	25%	
the	reward	option,	and	63%	the	
standard	PGG.	With	high	leverage:	
0%	choose	the	punishment	option,	
85%	choose	the	reward	option,	and	
15%	the	standard	PGG.	
Social	orientation	does	
not	predict	participation	
in	the	voting	or	the	
voting	decision.	
For	those	who	implement	the	
institution:	yes,	higher	cooperation	
under	endogenous	than	exogenous	
institution	(low‐leverage	
punishment:	81%	vs.	44%,	low‐
leverage	reward:	43%	vs.	33%,	
high‐leverage	reward:	73%	vs.	
56%).	For	those	who	do	not	
implement	the	institution:	only	
small	difference	between	
endogenous	and	exogenous	PGG	
(low	leverage:	27%	vs.	33%,	high	
leverage:	46%	vs.	33%).	
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Table	S.4	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	matching,	and	choice	 Available	institutions Decision	rule Treatment	
variables	
Experience	before	choice	
of	institution	&	
information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	
exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	an	informal	institution	(punishment	or	reward	option)
Noussair	&	
Tan	2011	
4,		
half	with	
low	
MPCR	
and	half	
with	high	
MPCR	
3+3+8+8+8	or	
3+3+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2+2	
rounds,	partner,	players	choose	at	the	
beginning	of	each	phase	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
punishment	option	
(cost	1:2)	allowing	
punishment	of	below‐
average	and/or	above‐
average	contributors,	
separately	for	low	and	
high	MPCR	subjects	
(modification	does	not	
change	the	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium).	
Repeated	majority	
voting	on	who	can	
be	punished	
(below‐average,	
above‐average	
contributors,	
separately	for	low	
and	high	MPCR	
subjects).		
Number	of	voting	
rounds	and	number	
of	contribution	
rounds	after	each	
voting	round	
3	rounds	PGG	and	3	rounds	
PGG	with	unrestricted	
punishment	option.	Before	
playing,	subjects	learned	
about	the	punishment	
restrictions.	After	playing,	
subjects	are	informed	
about	contributions	and	
payoffs	of	all	players	and	
about	own	received	and	
allocated	punishment.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes, cooperation	is	
higher	when	
punishment	is	allowed	
than	when	punishment	
is	prohibited	(Short‐
term	treatment:	49%	
vs.	2%,		long‐term	
treatment:	49%	vs.	
4%).	
Short‐term	treatment:	
proportion	of	groups	that	
implement	punishment	of	
below‐average	
contributors	is	50%	in	
the	first	round	and	83	%	
the	final	round.	
Proportion	of	groups	that	
prohibit	punishment	is	
17%	in	both	the	first	
round	and	the	final	
round.	
Long‐term	treatment:	
proportion	of	groups	that	
implement	punishment	of	
below‐average	
contributors	is	67%	in	
the	first	round	and	50%	
in	the	final	round.	
Proportion	of	groups	that	
prohibit	punishment	is	
17%	in	the	first	and	33	%	
in	the	final	round.	No	
group	allows	for	
unrestricted	punishment.
Above‐average	
contributors	are	more	
likely	to	vote	for	
punishment	of	below‐
average	contributors.	
Low	MPCR	types	are	
more	likely	to	vote	for	
punishment	of	high	
MPCR	types	(and	vice	
versa).	
n/a	
Dannenberg	
et	al.	2019	
5	 5	+	5	+5	+	5	rounds,	partner,	players	
choose	at	the	beginning	of	each	phase	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	
option	to	exclude	
players	(exclusion	
option	does	not	change	
zero‐contribution	
equilibrium)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	
Cost	of	the	
institution.	Control	
treatments	with	
exogenous	games.	
No	prior	experience.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	higher	
cooperation	with	
exclusion	option	than	
without	(76%	vs.	41%	
without	cost,	74%	vs.	
41%	with	cost)	
72%	of	groups	choose	the	
exclusion	option	without	
cost.	34%	choose	it	with	
cost.	
Subjects	who	face	little	
cooperation	in	the	PGG.
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	only	slightly	
higher	cooperation	under	
endogenous	than	exogenous	
institution	(76%	vs.	71%	
without	cost,	74%	vs.	69%	
with	cost).	For	those	who	do	
not	implement	the	
institution:	no	difference	or	
slightly	higher	cooperation	
in	endogenous	game	(41%	
vs.	41%	without	cost,	41%	
vs.	35%	with	cost).	
Choosing	between	a	formal	and	an	informal	institution
Kamei	et	al.	
2015	
5	 1+4+4+4+4+4+4	rounds,	partner,	
players	choose	at	the	beginning	of	
each	phase	
PGG	with	formal	
sanctioning	(FS)	vs.	
PGG	with	informal	
sanctioning	option	(IS)	
(cost	1:4)	(IS	does	not	
change	the	zero‐
contribution	
equilibrium,	deterrent	
FS	makes	full	
contributions	the	
dominant	strategy)	
Repeated	majority	
voting	to	choose	
between	FS	and	IS.	
Having	chosen	FS,	
subjects	also	
determine	
punishment	rate	
and	punishable	
action.	
Experience	before	
the	first	vote	(no	
experience	or	
experience	with	
both	punishment	
institutions).	
Number	of	voting	
rounds.	Cost	of	the	
FS	(with	or	without	
cost).	
1	round	of	the	standard	
PGG	or	4	rounds	of	each	
game	prior	to	voting.	
Before	playing,	subjects	
learn	about	the	
implemented	institution	
but	not	the	distribution	of	
votes.	After	playing,	
subjects	are	informed	
about	contributions	and	
received	punishment.	No	
information	about	other	
groups.	
Yes,	FS	leads	to	higher	
contributions	than	IS	
in	the	first	half	of	the	
game.	Differences	
disappear	in	the	
second	half.	Later	in	
the	game,	payoffs	with	
IS	are	higher	than	with	
costly	FS	and	about	the	
same	as	costless	FS.	
86%	of	groups	choose	FS	
when	it	is	free	of	cost.	
Only	28%	choose	FS	
when	it	is	costly.	Having	
chosen	FS,	most	groups	
implement	deterrent	FS.	
Subjects	with	higher	IQ	
are	more	likely	to	vote	
for	FS	when	it	is	free	of	
cost	and	for	IS	when	FS	
is	costly.	Experienced	
subjects	vote	for	the	
scheme	under	which	
they	earned	more.	
Anti‐social	punishers	
are	less	likely	to	vote	
for	costless	FS.	
For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	
endogenous	than	exogenous	
IS	institution.		
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Table	S.4	(continued) 
Study	 No.	of	
players	
Rounds,	matching,	
and	choice	
Available	institutions	 Decision	rule Treatment	variables Experience	before	choice	of	
institution	&	information	
Does	the	institution	
affect	cooperation?	
How	many	choose	the	
institution?	
Who	chooses	
the	
institution?	
Differences	between	
endogenous	and	
exogenous	institution?	
Choosing	between	a	formal	and	an	informal	institution
Markussen	
et	al.	2014	
5	 4+4+4+4+4+4+4	
rounds,	partner,	
players	choose	at	the	
beginning	of	each	
phase	
PGG	vs.	PGG	with	formal	sanctioning
(FS)	or	PGG	with	informal	sanctioning	
option	(IS)	(cost	1:4)	(IS	does	not	
change	the	zero‐contribution	
equilibrium,	deterrent	FS	makes	full	
contributions	the	dominant	strategy,	
non‐deterrent	FS	does	not	change	the	
zero‐contribution	equilibrium)	
Repeated	
majority	
voting	to	
choose	
between	two	
games	at	a	
time.	
Punishment	rate	
(deterrent	or	non‐
deterrent)	and	cost	
(cheap	or	expensive)	of	
the	formal	institution.	
Control	treatments	with	
exogenous	games.	
4	rounds	of	the	standard	PGG	before	
the	first	vote.	Before	playing,	
subjects	learn	about	the	
implemented	institution	but	not	the	
distribution	of	votes.	After	playing,	
subjects	are	informed	about	
contributions	and	received	
punishment.	No	information	about	
other	groups.	
Yes,	both	FS and	IS
lead	to	higher	
contributions	than	the	
standard	PGG.	Payoffs	
are	higher	at	least	in	
later	periods.	
	
	
IS vs. PGG:	About	20%	of	
groups	choose	IS	at	the	
beginning,	shares	later	
increase	to	50‐67%.	
FS	vs.	PGG:	Less	than	35%	of	
groups	choose	FS	when	it	is	
expensive	(even	when	it’s	
deterrent).	43‐58%	choose	FS	
when	it	is	cheap	and	non‐
deterrent.	More	than	70%	
choose	FS	when	it	is	cheap	
and	deterrent.	
IS	vs.	FS:	Less	than	35%	of	
groups	choose	FS	when	it	is	
expensive	(even	when	it’s	
deterrent).	About	30%	choose	
FS	when	it	is	cheap	and	non‐
deterrent.	58%	choose	FS	
when	it	is	cheap	and	
deterrent.	
n/a For	those	who	implement	
the	institution:	yes,	higher	
cooperation	under	
endogenous	than	
exogenous	institution	(for	
IS:	94%	vs.	74%,	for	non‐
deterrent	FS:	69%	vs.	
58%).	
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Table	S.5	Explanations	for	Figures	1‐4	in	the	main	paper	
Studies	in	Figure	1	 Source	 Treatment	 Comment	
Gürerk	et	al.	2006	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1.		 	 	
Grimm	&	Mengel	2009	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	1,	2	and	3.	 T0	 	
Grimm	&	Mengel	2011	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	1	and	2.	 x=0	 Average	cooperation	is	used	for	cooperation	outside	the	institution	because	no	numbers	are	provided	for	the	first	and	last	round.		
Gürerk	2013	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1.	 PUN	 	
Gürerk	2013	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1.	 SHT	 		
Gürerk	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1.		 VF‐PUN	 	
Gürerk	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1.		 VF‐REW	 	
Nicklisch	et	al.	2016	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 ONE	 “Inside	the	institution”	refers	to	both	decentralized	punishment	and	central	punishment	by	authority.	
Nicklisch	et	al.	2016	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 POINT‐NINE	 “Inside	the	institution”	refers	to	both	decentralized	punishment	and	central	punishment	by	authority.	
Nicklisch	et	al.	2016	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 POINT‐FIVE	 “Inside	the	institution”	refers	to	both	decentralized	punishment	and	central	punishment	by	authority.	
Fehr	&	Williams	2017	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	4	and	5	 	 “Inside	the	institution”	refers	to	both	coordinated	peer	punishment	and	central	punishment.	
Cobo‐Reyes	et	al.	2019	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	1	and	3.	 No‐Voting	 Share	inside	and	outside	the	institution	in	the	first	round	is	given	by	design.	
Cobo‐Reyes	et	al.	2019	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	1	and	3.	 Voting	 Share	inside	and	outside	the	institution	is	approximated	by	the	share	of	players	voting	for	it.	
Studies	in	Figure	2	
Dal	Bó	et	al.	2010	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	4.	 	 Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".		
Dal	Bó	et	al.	2018	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	12	Panels	A	
and	C	in	the	Appendix.	
Random	Dictator	 Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".		
	
Dal	Bó	et	al.	2018	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	12	Panels	A	
and	C	in	the	Appendix.	
Reverse	Random	
Dictator	
Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".		
	
Dal	Bó	et	al.	2018	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	12	Panels	A	
and	C	in	the	Appendix.	
Majority	Once	 Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".		
	
Dal	Bó	et	al.	2018	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	12	Panels	A	
and	C	in	the	Appendix.	
Majority	Repeated	 Groups	playing	the	prisoners’	dilemma	are	taken	as	“outside	the	institution”	and	groups	playing	the	Harmony	Game	are	taken	as	
“inside	the	institution.”	
Studies	in	Figure	3	
Kosfeld	et	al.	2009	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 IF40	 Low	MPCR.	Cooperation	outside	institution	includes	non‐members	of	the	institution	and	groups	in	which	no	institution	was	
implemented.
Kosfeld	et	al.	2009	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 IF65	 High	MPCR.	Cooperation	outside	institution	includes	non‐members	of	the	institution	and	groups	in	which	no	institution	was	
implemented.
McEvoy	et	al.	2011	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 Costless	
enforcement‐low	
	
McEvoy	et	al.	2011	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 Costly	enforcement	 	
McEvoy	et	al.	2011	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 Costless	
enforcement‐high	
	
McEvoy	et	al.	2011	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 Costly	
enforcement‐full	
	
Dannenberg	2012	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	author	 COALqual_maj	 	
Dannenberg	2012	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	author	 COALsimple_maj	 	
Gerber	et	al.	2013	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 IF4	 Cooperation	outside	institution	includes	non‐members	of	the	institution	and	groups	in	which	no	institution	was	implemented.	
Gerber	et	al.	2013	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 IF3	 Cooperation	outside	institution	includes	non‐members	of	the	institution	and	groups	in	which	no	institution	was	implemented.	
Gerber	et	al.	2013	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 IF43	 Cooperation	outside	institution	includes	non‐members	of	the	institution	and	groups	in	which	no	institution	was	implemented.	
Studies	in	Figure	4	
Sutter	&	Weck‐
Hannemann	2003	
Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 		 	
Ostrom	et	al.	1992	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	3.	 	 Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".	
Feld	&	Tyran	2002	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 	 Authors	used	strategy	method.	One‐shot	game,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.	
Sutter	&	Weck‐
Hannemann	2004	
Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 endo2‐tax	 Inside	institution	refers	to	low	minimum	contribution.	Average	cooperation	in	first	and	last	four	periods	are	used	respectively.	
Sutter	&	Weck‐
Hannemann	2004	
Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 endo4‐tax	 Inside	institution	refers	to	high	minimum	contribution.	Average	cooperation	in	first	and	last	four	periods	are	used	respectively.		
13	
 
Table	S.5	(continued) 
Studies	in	Figure	4	 Source	 Treatment	 Comment	
Tyran	&	Feld	2006	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	2	and	Section	
IV.	
Severe	law	 Authors	used	strategy	method.		Deterrent	punishment.	One‐shot	game,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.	
Tyran	&	Feld	2006	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	2	and	Section	
IV.	
Mild	law	 Authors	used	strategy	method.		Non‐deterrent	punishment.	One‐shot	game,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.	
Ertan	et	al.	2009	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	3.	 3‐Vote	Design	 Institution	refers	to	punishment	of	low‐but‐not‐high	contributors.		
Ertan	et	al.	2009	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	3.	 5‐Vote	Design	 Institution	refers	to	punishment	of	low‐but‐not‐high	contributors.		
Sutter	et	al.	2010	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	4.	 |L|=1	 Low	leverage.	Inside	institution	refers	to	punishment	or	reward.	Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.		
Sutter	et	al.	2010	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	4.	 |L|=3	 High	leverage.	Inside	institution	refers	to	punishment	or	reward.	Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.	
Andreoni	and	Gee	2012	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figure	1	and	table	2.	 	 	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 DC	(NS‐IS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	IS.		
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 NC	(NS‐IS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	IS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 DE	(NS‐IS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	IS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 NE	(NS‐IS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	IS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 DC	(NS‐FS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	FS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 NC	(NS‐FS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	FS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 DE	(NS‐FS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	FS.	
Markussen	et	al.	2014	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Figures	2	and	4.	 NE	(NS‐FS)	 First	and	last	choice	between	NS	and	FS.	
Kocher	et	al.	2016	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 MC=2	 Authors	used	strategy	method.		
Kocher	et	al.	2016	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 MC=7	 Authors	used	strategy	method.	
Barrett	&	Dannenberg	
2017	
Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 B10	 No	institutional	cost	
Barrett	&	Dannenberg	
2017	
Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 B8	 Institutional	cost	
Gallier	2017	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	4	in	the	
Appendix.	
		 Voting	once	for	all,	therefore	NA	in	"last	round".	
Vollan	et	al.	2017	 Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 		 Authors	used	strategy	method.		Each	treatment	is	played	one‐shot,	therefore	NA	in	“last	round”.	
Martinsson	&	Persson	
2018	
Numbers	are	taken	from	Table	1.	 	 	
Dannenberg	et	al.	2019	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 B10	 No	institutional	cost	
Dannenberg	et	al.	2019	 Numbers	have	been	provided	by	the	authors.	 B8	 Institutional	cost	
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